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 Current Directions in the Climate Change Debate in the United States 
 
  The United States – with 5 percent of the world’s population – is responsible for 
approximately 25 percent of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and its emissions continue 
to increase.
1  Having declined to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and as the world’s largest economy 
and biggest emitter of greenhouse gases, the United States is central to any long-term global 
strategy to address climate change.  As the international community works to agree on actions 
appropriate after the Protocol’s first commitment period ends in 2012, the domestic actions and 
international positions taken by United States are vitally important.  Accordingly, this chapter of 
the 2007 Human Development Report aims to provide a global audience with an overview of the 
climate change debate in the United States. 
 
  This chapter describes the debate across several dimensions.  To provide necessary 
context, the chapter begins with a review of historical and projected emission patterns and then 
moves to an analysis of the structure and drivers of U.S. GHG emissions.  Next, it explores the 
options for deep cuts in emissions from certain high-emitting sectors such as the electric power 
industry and the transportation sector.   Given limited action by the U.S. federal (i.e., national) 
government on the climate change issue, initiatives undertaken by state (i.e., sub-national) and 
local governments, as well as by the private sector, have been noteworthy and are briefly 
summarized in this chapter.  Next, broad policy measures being considered at the national level 
are described and the potential impact on the U.S. economy of deep cuts in GHG emissions is 
assessed.  The chapter concludes with a summary of how the United States might approach the 
post-2012 era, from both a policy and a political perspective. 
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  The climate change debate in the United States has taken place in the context of steadily 
increasing U.S. emissions of greenhouse gases.  In turn, because binding targets for emission 
reductions have been adopted by only a few state governments and because a modest non-
binding goal exists at the national level, 
emissions are forecast to continue increasing in 
the years to come unless major new policy 
measures are enacted. 
 
1.1 Historical Emission Trends
2
 
  U.S. emissions of GHGs have increased 
just about every year between 1990 and 2004.  
As shown in Figure 1, the only exceptions are 
two years characterized by economic 
slowdowns (1991 and 2001).  Total emissions went from 6,109 Tg CO2 eq to 7,074 Tg CO2 eq, 
an increase of almost 16 percent over the 14 year period, or 1.1 percent per year.
 3
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U.S. 2004 GHG Emissions by Gas














  As shown in Figure 2, CO2 is the dominant greenhouse gas emitted by the United States, 
comprising about 85 percent of total emissions, mostly from fossil fuel combustion.  Between 
1990 and 2004, CO2 emissions increased at 
a rate faster than aggregate emissions, 
climbing by almost 20 percent, or on an 










4 and N2O emissions, however, fe
over the same 14 year period:  CH4 
emissions by 10 percent and N2O emiss
by 2 percent.   Emissions of industrial 
greenhouse gases (i.e., HFCs, PFCs, and 
SF6) have increased rapidly, climbing ov
57 percent between 1990 and 2004, for an 
annual growth rate of 3.3 percent.   
 
 
e ns.  Figure 3 displays emissions by sector and demonstrates the substantial contrib
to emissions made by electricity generation, transportation, and industry.  Because fossil-fuel-
generated electricity is a major emission source, and because options for emissions reduction r
in part on increased efficiency in the use of electricity, another sectoral perspective can be 
obtained by allocating emissions from electricity generation to the sectors that use the elect
Figure 4 presents this view.  In this perspective, the transportation and industry sector remain 
major emitters while the commercial and residential sectors, due to their consumption of 
electricity, combine to represent about a third of national emissions. 
 
Figure 3:
















U.S. GHG Emissions by Sector













1.2 Current Emission Targets 




protection is measured in relation to GDP.   
 
of greenhouse gases, although several states have or are in the process of doing so.  When it 
comes to federal action, the only national target is a non-binding goal announced by Presiden
Bush on February 2002:  an 18 percent reduction in emissions intensity between by 2012.  
Emissions intensity is defined as the ratio of greenhouse gas emissions to economic output a
measured by gross domestic product (GDP).  This approach minimizes economic impact by 
allowing emissions to rise or fall with economic output; however, it provides no assurance th
given level of environmental protection will be achieved since the degree of environmental 
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  A GHG intensity target can lead to a net reduction in emissions, but only if it is 





4   
tal GHG emissions are likely to increase under the Administration’s policy, even as emissions 
tensit
here is 
vernments have moved 
rward with climate change policies.  As of April 2007, 14 U.S. states have established 
ns.  
n.   




n Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic 
ates, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is the first mandatory U.S. cap-and-trade 
 
ent has generated 
ultiple forecasts of the country’s greenhouse gas emissions.  Such estimates always include a 
baseline, or a reference case, which assumes that no new policy measures are adopted and that 
su
however, represents only a very modest improvement over historical patterns.  While U.
emissions increased over the last two decades, greenhouse gas intensity actually decreased.  
Thanks to energy efficiency improvements, the introduction of new information technologie
and the continued transition from heavy industry to less energy-intensive industries, greenhou
gas intensity in the United States fell by 21 percent in the 1980s and by 16 percent in the 1990s
 
  In addition, because significant growth in U.S. GDP is expected between now and 2012, 
to
in y falls.  For example, U.S. GDP is forecast to increase by almost 25 percent between 
2002 and 2012.
5  A GHG intensity reduction target of 18 percent over the same period is 
insufficiently stringent to fully offset the impact of such growth.  What’s more, because the 
target is not binding, and is being implementing only through voluntary policy measures, t
little assurance that even this modest intensity target will be achieved. 
 
  In the absence of strong federal action, several state and local go
fo
greenhouse gas emissions targets.
6  These programs differ with respect to sectors and gases 
covered, implementation mechanisms, and the speed and extent of the emissions reductio
Two noteworthy initiatives are in the Western States and in the Northeast/Mid-Atlantic regio
 
  The California Global Warming Solutions Act of September 2006 caps California’s 
g
state-wide program in the U.S. to cap all GHG emissions from major industries that includes
penalties for non-compliance.  The Act authorizes the State Air Resources Board to adopt 
market-based compliance mechanisms including a cap-and-trade program.
7   In addition, on 
February 26, 2007, Arizona, California, New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington formed the
Western Regional Climate Action Initiative to implement a joint emission reduction strategy.
Within two years, these states will set a regional emission target and devise a market-based 
program, such as a cap and trade program to reach the target.
8
 
  Established in December 2005 by the governors of seve
st
program for carbon dioxide. It sets a cap on emissions of carbon dioxide from power plants, and 
allows sources to trade emissions allowances.  Massachusetts and Maryland joined in 2007 and 
Rhode Island has announced its intent to join.
9  In addition to emission reduction targets, state 
and local governments across the U.S. have taken a wide range of other steps to address the issue
of climate change.  These activities are described in more detail in Section 4 below. 
 
1.3 Future Emission Forecasts and Scenarios 
 
  During the past several years, the United States federal governm
m
24 April Working Draft - Page 3 of 49 fi onsumers, and government behave in a “business as usual” (BAU) manner.  Altern
emission forecasts are also often generated to reflect different assumptions about economic, 
technological, and/or policy factors.  Because of the diversity of such alternate forecasts and the
dependence on specific, potentially unique, input assumptions, they are not discussed here.
Figure 5:
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  Responsibility for predicting U.S. GHG emissions is shared by two Federal agencies, the 
Depart the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  DOE produces 










 period from 1990 to 2004.  




Instead, the latest U.S. BAU forecast – which assumes no new policy initiatives or emission 
targets are adopted – is presented.  This BAU forecast (in Section 1.3.1) is complemented (in 
Section 1.3.2) by the results of an exercise conducted by the Pew Center on Global Climate 
Change in which three scenarios were assessed with respect to GHG emissions over time. 
 
1.3.1 Emission Forecasts 
 
ment of Energy (DOE) and 
reference case incorporates baseline assumptions about economic growth, energy prices, energy 
consumption, energy intensity, electricity generation, and energy production and imports.  The 
latest EPA forecast of U.S. emissions of non-CO2 GHGs is embedded in a 2006 study to 
characterize emissions from 90 
individual countries from 1990 to 
2020.
11   To forecast U.S. emissions,
EPA uses multiple projection 
techniques depending on the sector an
gas under analysis.  EPA’s BAU
scenario assumes full implement
of a set of industry-agreed red
goals for emissions of CH4, HFC
PFCs, and SF6.  DOE’s 2006 refere
case and EPA’s business as usual 
forecasts have been combined 
Figure 5 to show annual U.S. 
emissions projected over the 15 year period from 2005 to 2020.   
 
  The data indicate that in the absence of significant policy changes, U.S. emissions are
likely to grow at 1.2 percent per year, roughly the same rate as the
E
Despite falling over the prior 14 years, CH4 and N2O emissions are forecast to begin rising, bo
experiencing an annual growth rate of 0.4 percent.  Given historical reductions and this modest
growth rate, 2020 emissions of both CH
th 
4 and N20 are forecast to be less than 2000 emissions.  
Emissions of high-GWP industrial gases rise faster than other GHGs, driven in large measure by 
the substitution of HFCs and PFCs for ozone depleting substances being phased out under the 
Montreal Protocol.  Despite rising at an annual rate of over 5 percent, high-GWP industrial gase
are projected to comprise only about 3.5 percent of U.S. GHG emissions in 2020. 
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  The question of how U.S. energy supply and use – which account for over 80 percent of 
US greenhouse gas emissions – will evolve over the next several decades is fundamental to 
understanding future emissions.  Because the largest component of GHG emissions is carbon 
dioxide from energy use, it is informative to conduct scenario analyses to determine plausible 
energy and emissions profiles, looking beyond standard business as usual forecasts.  
 
  With the help of the Global Business Network and several stakeholders, the Pew Center 
conducted such an analysis of three divergent paths for U.S. energy supply and use from 2000 
through 2035.
12   The three scenarios are not predictions; however, they can help describe 
plausible futures and identify implications of various futures and key technologies, energy policy 
decisions, and strategic investment choices that can enhance (or complicate) energy security, 
environmental protection, and economic development goals.   
 
•  Awash in Oil and Gas is a scenario in which abundant supplies of oil and natural gas remain 
available to U.S. consumers at low prices. Energy consumption rises considerably and 
conventional technologies dominate the energy sector. In this low energy price scenario, 
there are few incentives to improve energy efficiency and little concern for energy issues. 
Carbon emissions rise 50 percent above the year 2000 level by 2035.  
 
•  Technology Triumphs is a scenario in which an array of driving forces converge to 
accelerate the successful commercialization in the U.S. market of many technologies that 
improve energy efficiency and produce lower carbon emissions, and in which U.S. 
companies play a key role in the subsequent development of an international market for these 
technologies. Despite sustained economic growth and an increase in energy consumption, 
carbon emissions rise 15 percent above the year 2000 level by 2035. 
 
•  Turbulent World is a scenario in which U.S. energy markets are repeatedly buffeted by 
developments at home and abroad, with unsettling effects on energy prices and mounting 
threats to U.S. energy security. High energy prices and uncertainty about energy supplies 
slow economic growth, and the country moves from one technological “solution” to another, 
finding serious flaws with each, until finally settling on a program to accelerate the 
commercialization of hydrogen and fuel cells. Despite slower economic growth in Turbulent 
World, carbon emissions rise 20 percent above the year 2000 level by 2035.  
 
  Climate change policy was deliberately excluded from these three scenarios.  It was 
important to determine what might happen to emissions under these scenarios in the absence of 
US policy.  However, it became clear that under all scenarios – even those with optimistic 
assumptions regarding technology, emissions would continue to increase.  Once this consistent 
outcome became apparent, the participants in the scenario development process formulated a 
hypothetical climate policy overlay. The policy overlay postulated a freeze of U.S. CO2 
emissions in 2010 and subsequent 2 percent per year decreases from 2010 to 2025, followed by 3 
percent per year decreases to 2035. The policy overlay is neither a prediction nor a 
recommendation. To achieve the targeted emissions reductions trajectory and create the policy 
overlay cases, the same portfolio of primarily market-oriented policies and programs was 
24 April Working Draft - Page 5 of 49 imposed on each base case scenario.
13  
 
  When the policy overlay is applied to each of the base case scenarios, it modifies the 
pattern of energy technology development.  For example, in the base case of the Turbulent 
World scenario, concerns about energy security stimulate a major national commitment to 
expanding production of hydrogen from coal and to accelerating the development of hydrogen 
fuel cells, both for transportation and in stationary power applications. In the policy overlay case 
for the Turbulent World scenario, the carbon constraint combines with growing public and 
private concerns about the security of energy facilities to stimulate demand for distributed 
generation (DG) and for combined heat and power (CHP) systems. 
 
 In  the  Technology Triumphs base case, new technologies already contribute to a 
slowing in the growth of carbon emissions. In the policy overlay case for Technology Triumphs, 
the carbon emissions limit forces faster reductions in oil demand, especially in the transportation 
sector, compared to the Technology Triumphs base case, resulting in accelerated market 
penetration by hybrid gasoline-electric and diesel-electric vehicles. Imposition of the carbon 
constraint in the policy overlay case expedites efforts to lower the barriers that typically hold 
back distributed generation, end-use efficiency improvements, and renewable energy 
technologies from large-scale commercialization in the United States. 
 
 In  Awash in Oil and Gas, imposing carbon policies is more complex and more 
challenging. The base case scenario, built around cheap and abundant resources of oil and gas, 
includes little private investment in the technologies that improve end-use efficiency or reduce 
carbon emissions. Thus, meeting the carbon emissions target of the policy overlay introduces 
tremendous tension into this scenario. Major federal programs are needed to mandate carbon 
reductions and educate individual and industrial consumers about the climate consequences of 
their energy use. Yet cheap fuel encourages consumers to drive inefficient vehicles and 
stimulates air travel. Facing an exceedingly tight constraint on emissions and with little time to 
upgrade capital stock, public and private decision-makers move aggressively (but late in the 
scenario period) to develop carbon capture and geological sequestration technology so as to keep 
combustion-derived carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere. 
 
  Taken together, this scenario analysis revealed three important conclusions:  
 
•  Without emission reduction policies, emissions increase over the next three decades in all 
three scenarios, even those with optimistic assumptions about the future cost and 
performance of energy technologies.  Climate change policy is needed to stem future 
emissions growth, regardless of which path the U.S. energy future ultimately takes.  
 
•  Policy and investment decisions today will have a significant impact on the difficulty of 
reducing energy-related carbon emissions tomorrow. Early and sustained investment, 
engineering success, and consumer acceptance of low-carbon and efficiency-improving 
technologies make the task of reducing emissions easier, as do energy security policies that 
reduce oil import dependence. Low fossil fuel prices make the task harder by encouraging 
high-carbon and energy-inefficient investments. Other scenario conditions, such as external 
events, play a major role as well.  
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•  A portfolio of policies combining technology performance targets, market incentives, and 
price-oriented measures can help the U.S. meet complementary energy security, climate 
protection, and economic objectives. Targeted policies can stimulate investment, accelerate 
the turnover of capital stock, and encourage emissions reductions. Emissions allowance 
trading, along with informational and other programs designed to address market 
imperfections, can lower the barriers to commercialization of efficiency-improving measures 
and new low-emissions technologies. However, policies designed to reduce carbon emissions 
can entail significant costs for the energy and energy-intensive sectors of the economy. 
Flexible program design, as well as successful development of major new technologies, can 
help to reduce these costs. 
 
2.  Structure and Drivers of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
 
  The broad emission trends described above reflect the dynamic structure of the U.S. 
economy and the cumulative effect of changes in emissions from each sector of the economy.  
When it comes to understanding what drives U.S. GHG emissions, four sectors – electric power 
generation and use, transportation, manufacturing, and agriculture – are especially important.   
 
2.1 Structure & Drivers of Emissions from Electric Power Generation 
 
  GHG emissions from the power sector, which produces 32 percent of all U.S. 
emissions,
14 have grown from 1,803 Tg CO2 in 1990 to 2,309 Tg CO2 in 2004 – an annual 
increase of 1.8 percent.
15  Under a BAU scenario, emissions from the sector are projected to 
increase annually at 1.4 percent between 2005 and 2030, substantially outpacing the 1.0 percent 
growth rate of CO2 emissions from all other sources.
16  Power-sector emissions are driven by 




Energy Demand:  Continued Growth in Electricity   
 
  The efficiency of electricity end-uses has improved substantially since the early 1970s.
18  
Key drivers include technological innovation and higher electricity prices.  In addition, the 
Federal government sets appliance efficiency standards, annually funds $963 million in research 
and development related to energy efficiency and renewables,
19 and operates the Energy Star 
programs (with savings of 170 billion kilowatt-hours in 2006
20).  Electric utilities also 
implement programs to encourage conservation and enhance efficiency; industry spending in this 
arena is estimated at $14.7 billion between 1989 and 1999.
21  State regulators play a key role by 
requiring utility investments in efficiency and authorizing pricing strategies to moderate demand; 
many states – some using federal models – have also adopted building codes that enhance 
efficiency.
22   
 
  Efficiency improvements notwithstanding, however, demand is likely to continue to grow 
substantially.  Electricity sales are expected to climb from 3,660 billion kilowatt-hours in 2005 to 
5,168 billion kilowatt-hours in 2030, for an annual increase of 1.4 percent.
23   
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to grow by 2.0 percent per year.  Population and income growth will increase demand for 
goods and services, in turn pushing up commercial floor space and the associated heating and 
cooling costs, along with energy consumed by appliances and equipment used in commerce.   
 
  Through 2030, residential electricity demand is projected to grow annually by 1.3 percent, 
driven in part by population growth from 296 million in 2005 to 364 million in 2030.
24  
Home sizes (and the associated heating and cooling loads) are also increasing; the average 
new home went from 1,500 square feet to 2,300 square feet over the past 30 years.
25  
Population growth in warm regions of the U.S. will make residential air conditioning even 
more widespread; electronic equipment and appliance use in homes is also increasing.
26 
 
  Industrial demand is forecast to grow at a 0.6 percent rate.   The relatively slow growth of 
industrial demand for purchased electricity, however, occurs in tandem with an expansion of 
on-site generation of electricity by industry.  Accordingly, the emissions impact of the slower 
growth will be offset by the level and carbon intensity of industrial on-site generation. 
 
  Energy Supply:  Carbon Content of Fuels Used to Generate Electricity 
 
  As shown in Figure 6, while coal is used to produce about half of the electricity in the 
U.S., several other fuels are also used.  Each fuel emits significantly different amounts of CO2.  
Nuclear power, hydropower, and other renewable resources release no carbon and, among fossil 
fuels, coal contains the most carbon and natural gas the least.  Consequently, coal is by far the 
biggest source of CO2 emissions associated with electricity.   As indicated in Figure 7, coal’s 
share of U.S. emissions is 82 percent while gas and petroleum contribute significantly less. 
Figure 6
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Changes over the coming years in the fuel mix for electric power generation in the United States 
will be driven by factors unique to each fuel source.    
 
  Coal:  Large domestic supplies and low operating costs make coal an attractive choice for 
electric utilities.
 27  In the absence of climate policy, more than half of the generation 
capacity added in the next 25 years is expected to be coal-fired.  Electricity generated with 
coal is expected to grow by 1.9 percent per year between 2005 and 2030.
28 
 
  Natural Gas:  In recent years, natural gas prices jumped significantly and the power industry 
has become more cautious about investing in gas-fired generation capacity.
29  Investments 
24 April Working Draft - Page 8 of 49 are expected to continue, but as gas prices rise, fewer plants will be built.  Electricity 
generated with gas is expected to grow annually by only 0.3 percent between 2005 and 2030. 
 
  Petroleum:  Use of oil to generate electricity in the U.S. has dropped dramatically.  This is 
partly due to environmental regulations, as well as to price and supply volatility.  Electricity 
generated with oil is expected to shrink by 0.9 percent per year between 2005 and 2030. 
 
  Nuclear:  About a fifth of the electricity generated in the U.S. comes from nuclear power, but 
due to high initial costs and uncertain approvals for new plants (due to public concerns about 
safety, waste disposal, and security of nuclear materials), no new nuclear plant has come on-
line since 1996.
30   Federal legislation in 2005, however, provides tax credits that are 
expected to stimulate some new construction.  In turn, nuclear-generated electricity is 
expected to grow by 0.6 percent per year between 2005 and 2030. 
 
  Hydropower:    Between a concern about its environmental consequences and few suitable 
dam sites, there is only limited scope for expanding the U.S. capacity to generate electricity 
using hydropower.  The amount of electricity generated with hydropower is expected to grow 
0.6 percent per year between 2005 and 2030.
  
 
  Other Renewables:  Driven in part by regulations in several states requiring utilities to 
generate a specified minimum fraction of their power from renewable resources and, in some 
cases by favorable tax treatment, use of renewable resources, especially biomass, is expected 
to increase.  The amount of electricity generated with non-hydropower renewable fuels is 
expected to grow at a high rate – 4.0 percent per year between 2005 and 2030. 
 
  As shown in Figure 8, given these trends in 
the fuel mix used to generate electricity, the sector is 
expected to become even more carbon intensive over 
the next 25 years.  If projections hold, coal will 
produce 59 percent of all electricity, up from 51 
percent in 2005.  Nuclear power, natural gas, and 
petroleum will shrink, in relative terms.  Renewable 
energy will remain constant at about 9 percent of the 
total mix, although hydropower will shrink and be 
replaced by other renewables.  In the absence of 
major policy changes or technological innovations, 
the increasing carbon intensity of electric power 
generation and continually growing demand for 
electricity explain the significant CO2 increases 
likely to be seen in this sector in coming years. 
Figure 8 
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2.2 Structure & Drivers of Emissions from the Transportation Sector
31  
  
  GHG emissions from the transportation sector, which produces 28 percent of all U.S. 
emissions, grew more rapidly than any other sector between 1990 and 2004.  Emissions grew 
from 1,523 Tg CO2 eq to 1,960 Tg CO2 eq – an annual increase of 1.8 percent.
32  Under a BAU 
24 April Working Draft - Page 9 of 49 scenario, CO2 emissions from the sector are projected to increase annually at 1.3 percent between 
2005 and 2030, outpacing the 1.1 percent growth rate of CO2 emissions from all other sources.
33   
 
  Highway vehicles are responsible for about 81 percent of the emissions from the 
transportation sector with aircraft (9 percent), waterborne shipping (3 percent), and rail (2 
percent)  comprising most of the balance.  The discussion below – focused on highway vehicles 
– distinguishes “light-duty” vehicles (passenger cars, vans, pickup trucks, and sport utility 
vehicles, or SUVs) from “heavy duty vehicles” (freight trucks and buses).   
 
  Aggregate emissions from any particular type of vehicle is a function of three factors:  
the vehicle miles traveled (VMT), the efficiency of the vehicle (typically expressed as miles per 
gallon or mpg), and the carbon content of the fuel.   In broad terms, while there were significant 
decreases in the energy intensity of the sector during 1970s –1980s (due to oil shocks and related 
imposition of stricter federal mileage standards), emissions have risen in recent decades because 
vehicle miles traveled have grown faster than efficiency has improved and because little low-
carbon fuel is used.   
 
Light Duty Vehicles 
 
  The 136 million passenger cars on the U.S. roads contributed 35 percent of transportation 
emissions while the 87 million light duty trucks (i.e., vans, pickup trucks, and SUVs) contributed 
27 percent.  GHG emissions from these vehicles grew 19 percent between 1990 and 2003.  The 
primary driver of the emission upsurge is the increase in VMT, which climbed by 34 percent 
over the same period, or more than twice the increase in population.  VMT has increased rapidly 
for several reasons:  population growth, higher vehicle ownership rates, less commuter use of 
public transit, decreases in vehicle occupancy, more trips per household, and longer trip lengths. 
 
  Historically, the Federal Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) requirement has 
driven changes in vehicle efficiency.
34  CAFE standards for passenger cars increased from 18.0 
mpg in 1978 to 27.5 mpg in 1985 (still in place today).  Light trucks (which include SUVs and 
minivans) have lower targets – 20.5 mpg in 1987 and 20.7 mpg today, although a March 2006 
regulation will tighten and extend standards for light trucks.
35  Between 1975 and 1988, CAFE 
standards resulted in significant efficiency improvements as new passenger car mileage 
increased from 15.8 to 28.6 mpg and light truck mileage grew from 13.7 to 21.2 mpg. 
 
  In recent years, however, the differential CAFE standards for cars and light trucks, 
respectively, 27.5 mpg and 20.7 mpg – coupled with a shift to more purchases of light trucks, 
including SUVs -- have had a significant effect on overall mileage level of light duty vehicles.  
In 1976, only about one in five light duty vehicles sold was a light truck.  In 2002, the number of 
light trucks sold exceeded new passenger cars sold.  The fuel economy of new light duty vehicles 
peaked in 1987 at 22.1 mpg and decreased to 20.8 mpg in 2004.   
 
  In his January 2007 State of the Union address, President Bush proposed revisiting the 
light duty vehicle fuel economy standards, but stopped short of committing to actual 
improvements.  To generate his target savings in gasoline use, he cited an example of a 4 percent 
annual improvement in CAFE standards. However, the President's proposal does not commit to a 
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revisit the automobile standard but not to specify an actual numerical target.   
  While recent years have seen significant improvements in engine technologies and 
vehicle design, such improvements have been used to increase the power, performance, and 
safety of new vehicles rather than to enhance fuel economy.  In addition, although alternative 
vehicle technologies and fuels are being introduced in the U.S. and offer the potential to 
significantly reduce GHG emissions, the current market penetration of such alternatives is 
limited.  Examples include: 
 
  Hybrid vehicles couple an internal combustion engine with an electric motor.  The electric 
motor provides peak power for acceleration and allows the internal combustion engine to be 
shut down rather than idling or decelerating.  Currently, hybrids represent a very small, but 
growing, fraction of new vehicles sold.   
 
  Ethanol is also being more widely used as a supplement to gasoline and more vehicles that 
can operate on either gasoline or ethanol are being marketed.  In the U.S., ethanol competes 
in the fuel market as a gasoline additive at levels of up to 10 percent by volume.  There is 
currently a federal tax incentive of roughly 51 cents per gallon of ethanol, which makes it 
competitive with gasoline, particularly with recent high gasoline prices. 
 
  Looking to the future,
36 VMT by light duty vehicles is expected to continue to grow 
quickly, at a rate of 1.9 percent per year between 2005 and 2030.  At the same time, market 
penetration of unconventional vehicle technologies and fuels (primarily flex-fuel, electric hybrid, 
advanced diesel, and natural gas) is expected to climb to 27 percent of total light duty vehicle 
sales in 2030.
37   Driven by mandated improvements in the fuel economy of the increasingly 
popular light trucks and greater penetration of alternative technology vehicles, fuel economy of 
the fleet of light duty vehicles is likely to improve somewhat.  The projected annual 
improvement in mileage of 0.6 percent is, however, insufficient to fully offset the VMT increase.   
 
  Heavy Duty Vehicles 
 
  In 2003, there were about 8 million heavy duty vehicles on the U.S. roads, accounting for 
about 19 percent of transportation GHG emissions.  Emissions from these vehicles jumped by 57 
percent between 1990 and 2003, more than any other major transportation source.  Virtually all 
of these emissions come from freight trucks, with only 3 percent coming from buses. 
 
  Heavy duty truck VMT increased by 48 percent between 1990 and 2003.  In addition to 
economic growth, VMT has been pushed up by a growing business preference for trucking over 
rail and water-borne shipping owing to its flexibility to accommodate shifts in warehouse and 
manufacturing locations, the decline in its cost relative to other modes after price deregulation in 
1980, and increased shipment of higher value, lower weight products which are better suited to 
carriage by truck than by rail or water.  
 
  The average fuel economy of the heavy-duty truck fleet decreased to 5.7 mpg in 2003, as 
compared to 6.0 mpg in 1990.  While the factors underlying this change are somewhat unclear, it 
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period.  The government does not set fuel economy standards for heavy duty trucks. 
 
  The use of biodiesel offers an opportunity to reduce the amount of non-renewable carbon 
emitted from the U.S. truck fleet.  Biodiesel today is roughly where corn ethanol was in the U.S. 
a few decades ago.   Production capacity in 2006 reached almost 400 million gallons.
38  The bulk 
of biodiesel sold in the U.S. is made from soybean oil, with some production using waste greases 
and fats.  Tax incentives offered in the form of commodity credit payments by the Department of 
Agriculture to soybean producers and federal tax breaks have dramatically increased interest in 
biodiesel in the U.S.  Like corn ethanol, biodiesel requires fossil energy to produce; however, 
soybean farming requires little nitrogen fertilizer and processing is not very energy-intensive.   
Biodiesel is currently more costly than conventional diesel. 
 
  Looking to the future,
39 VMT by freight trucks is expected to continue to grow quickly, 
at a rate of 2.2 percent per year between 2005 and 2030.  Over the same time, however, fleet fuel 
economy is only expected to climb from 6.0 mpg in 2005 to 6.7 mpg in 2030, a rate of 0.4 
percent per year and an improvement insufficient to fully offset the increase in VMT.   
 
2.3 Structure & Drivers of Emissions from the Manufacturing Sector
40
 
  The manufacturing sector is a 
significant source of GHG emissions in the 
United States.  When it comes to energy-
related CO2, for example, manufacturing 
emitted 1,429 Tg CO2 in 2005, about 24 
percent of total U.S. emissions of 5,945 Tg 
CO2.
41  In addition, a large fraction of the 
321 Tg CO2 eq in 2004 industrial process 
emissions came from the manufacturing 
sector.
42  As shown in Figure 9, the three 
manufacturing industries with the highest 
energy-related carbon dioxide emissions are bulk chemical production, petroleum refining, and 
iron and steel manufacturing.
43   
Figure 9:  2005 Energy-Related CO2 Manufacturing Emissions 


























  Manufacturing emissions, however, have not grown as fast as overall national emissions.  
For example, CO2 emissions from all sources climbed by 20 percent between 1991 and 2005
44 
while energy-related CO2 emissions from manufacturing went up by only 14 percent in the same 
period (i.e., from 1,251 Tg CO2
45 to 1,429 Tg CO2).   
 
 What  are the drivers of emissions in the U.S. manufacturing sector?  The answer is not 
straightforward.  Some drivers create upward pressure on emissions while others push emissions 
downward.  In addition, countervailing forces produce different results across different 
manufacturing industries.  Several of the key drivers are noted below. 
 
  As measured by the economic value of its products, the U.S. manufacturing sector grew 
more slowly than the U.S. economy as a whole over the past fifteen years.  Between 1990 and 
24 April Working Draft - Page 12 of 49 2005, the manufacturing portion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rose by 60 percent while 
total GDP rose by 115 percent, almost twice as much.  As a consequence, manufacturing fell to 
only 12 percent of the 2005 American economy from its 1990 level of over 16 percent.
 46  
 
  Not only is the manufacturing sector becoming a smaller proportion of the total economy, 
the structure of the sector itself is changing.
47  Five manufacturing industries (computer 
products, petroleum and coal products, motor vehicles, miscellaneous manufacturing, and 
plastics and rubber products) have grown faster in real terms between 1990 and 2005 than the 
sector as a whole, but all other manufacturing industries, including nonmetallic mineral products 
(of which cement manufacturing is a part), chemical products, primary metals, and paper 
products grew more slowly than the sector as a whole.  Four industries – wood products, 
printing, transportation other than vehicles, and apparel – actually shrank in real terms.   As a 
consequence of these intra-sectoral shifts, the composition of the sector itself has changed 
appreciably during the 15 year period ending in 2005.  Between 1990 and 2005, the petroleum 
and chemicals industries each increased its economic share of the manufacturing sector while the 
shares of  primary metals and food remained virtually unchanged and the paper industry’s share 
of the sector decreased. 
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it comes to GHG emissions.   Some manufacturing industries emit significantly more greenhouse 
gases per dollar of 
economic activity (i.e., 
have a higher “carbon-
intensity”) than do others.  
In 2002, for example, for 
every million dollars of 
gross output, the primary 
metals industry emitted 
1,532 tons of carbon 
dioxide and the petroleum 
industry emitted 1,312 
tons.  On the other hand, 
the paper industry emitted 
668 tons of CO2 per 
million dollars of gross output 
and the “other manufacturing” 




   Another important 
consideration is whether a 
particular manufacturing 
industry is becoming more or 
less carbon intensive over 
time.  Here again there is 
considerable variation within 
the sector.  The primary 
metals industry, for example, 
has become less carbon 
intensive over time, reducing 
its emissions from 1,688 tons 
of energy-related CO2 per million dollars of gross output in 1991 to the aforementioned 1,532 
tons in 2002 (an average annual decline of 0.9 percent).   Over the same period, the carbon 
intensity of the chemicals industry increased by an average 0.6 percent per year (i.e., from 708 
tons per million dollars of gross output in 1991 to 758 tons in 2002) while the carbon intensity of 
the petroleum industry remained unchanged. 
 
  Looking to the future, DOE’s 2007 Annual Energy Outlook projected the combined 
effect of these drivers when it generated a 25 year forecast of CO2 emission from major 
manufacturing industries.  Table 1 presents the DOE forecast.  The industry with the greatest 
emissions – bulk chemicals – is projected to experience emissions growth of only about 0.1 
percent per year.  Emissions from petroleum refining, on the other hand, are expected to grow 
dramatically, at a rate of 2.1 percent per year, while emissions from aluminum manufacture drop 
Table 1 













Bulk Chemicals  330.7  23.1%  0.1% 
Petroleum Refining  224.5  15.7%  2.1% 
Iron and Steel  127.3  8.9%  0.3% 
Paper 104.1  7.3%  0.2% 
Food 95.5  6.7%  0.9% 
Aluminum 45.6  3.2%  -0.9% 
Transportation Equipment  44.0  3.1%  1.1% 
Plastics 43.7  3.1%  0.6% 
Fabricated Metal Products  41.8  2.9%  0.6% 
Cement 39.9  2.8%  0.5% 
Figure 10
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24 April Working Draft - Page 14 of 49 by 0.9 percent per year.  Twenty-five year emission trends for the top four CO2 emitting 
manufacturing industries are shown in Figure 10. 
 
  When it comes to process emissions of GHGs – emissions not related to energy but to the 
releases during the manufacturing process itself – historical changes in emissions within the 
manufacturing sector again demonstrate the diversity within the sector.  For example, the two 
largest U.S. sources of industrial process emissions are iron and steel production, which emitted 
52 Tg CO2 eq in 2004 (down 39 percent from 1990) and cement manufacture which emitted 46 
Tg CO2 eq (up 37 percent from 1990).   
 
  In summary, several drivers are affecting GHG emissions from the U.S. manufacturing 
sector.  The sector is becoming a smaller part of the U.S. economy over time and the 
composition of the sector itself is changing with some of the highest-emitting industries 
increasing their share of the sector’s economic activity, some holding their share of the sector 
steady, and others decreasing their share.  Improvements in energy efficiency have reduced the 
carbon intensity of some but not all manufacturing industries.  Taken together, these drivers 
indicate that an industry like petroleum refining is projected to increase its energy-related CO2 
emissions by 68 percent in the next 25 years while emissions from bulk chemical manufacturing 
are expected to go up by only 2 percent over the same period.  Similarly, process emissions have 
been reduced in some manufacturing industries, but have increased in others.  In short, it is 
virtually impossible to generalize about the GHG emissions of the manufacturing sector as a 
whole.  Each industry within the sector has unique characteristics related the drivers of both its 
economic performance and its emissions patterns. 
 
2.4 Structure & Drivers of GHG Emissions from the Agriculture Sector
50
 
  All three of the major greenhouse gases— carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide – 
are components of the earth’s natural cycling of carbon and nitrogen.  Agricultural lands, 
because of their large extent and intensive management,
51 have a significant impact on the 
earth’s carbon and nitrogen cycles, and agricultural activities result in releases of all three of 
these greenhouse gases.  While currently a substantial source of GHGs, agriculture has great 
potential to reduce the buildup of these gases in the atmosphere.  Importantly, studies to date 
suggest that a significant portion of the agricultural practices that could reduce emissions or 
remove CO2 from the atmosphere are relatively low-cost.   
 
  GHG emissions and sinks due to U.S. agriculture, as shown in Figure 11, are reported 
annually by EPA as part of the U.S. commitment to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change.  While these estimates of emissions and sinks are based on the best available 
scientific information, and are derived by using internationally accepted accounting procedures, 
there is considerable uncertainty in their magnitude.   
 
Figure 11 
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  Over the past decade, U.S. agricultural soils overall have acted as a small net sink of 
approximately 12 million metric tons (MMT) of carbon per year, mainly due to improved soil 
management practices and the establishment of conservation reserve lands (USEPA 2006).  
These practices are helping to sequester about 23 MMT of carbon per year in mineral soils, 
which make up greater than 99 percent of annual cropland area.  However, net carbon emissions 
of about ten MMT of carbon per year from the small area (about 1.3 million hectares [Mha]) of 
cultivated organic (i.e., peat and muck) soils
52 offset 40 percent of the carbon gain in non-
organic (mineral) soils.  Emissions from agricultural liming contribute an additional one MMT of 
carbon per year, so that–taking into account both soil emissions and sinks–the result is a net sink 
of about 12 MMT of carbon per year.  
 
 CO2 emissions from U.S. agricultural energy use amount to about 25 to 30 MMT of 
carbon per year.  Nitrous oxide emissions (76 MMT carbon-equivalent per year in 2004) are the 
dominant agricultural contribution to the greenhouse effect when expressed on the basis of their 
global warming potential (GWP), a measure commonly used to equate the warming effects of 
different GHGs.  The main sources of nitrous oxide are nitrogen fertilizers and manure applied to 
cropland and pastures, leguminous crops, and crop residues.  Some nitrous oxide emissions also 
occur from stored manure.  Annual U.S. agricultural methane emissions are approximately 44 
MMT carbon-equivalent per year (2004 estimate) and stem mainly from livestock, animal waste, 
24 April Working Draft - Page 16 of 49 and rice cultivation.  In aggregate, agricultural GHG emissions account for roughly 8 percent of 
total U.S. emissions from all sources (USEPA 2006), on a carbon-equivalent basis.  
 
3.  Scope for Deep Cuts in Sectoral Emissions 
 
  Globally addressing the issue of climate change requires the United States – as the 
world’s largest emitter of GHGs – to make deep cuts in its emissions.  According to the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, global GHG emissions need to be cut by about 50 
to 80 percent (relative to a Business as Usual, or BAU, scenario) to stabilize atmospheric 
concentrations and avoid dangerous climate change.
53  Immediate reductions of this magnitude 
would have enormous cost; instead, interim reductions must be made over a longer time period. 
One domestic target for interim reductions comes from California, which capped its GHG 
emissions at 1990 levels by 2020.
54  A second, international, target is the recent commitment by 
the European Union to reduce emissions by 20 percent from 1990 levels by 2020 and to increase 
that reduction to 30 percent if other industrialized nations agreed to similar reductions.
55   These 
targets are combined in Table 1 with actual 1990 U.S. emissions and forecast 2020 emissions 
under a BAU scenario to develop indicative interim U.S. reduction levels for 2020. 
 
Table 2 
Applying Emission Reduction Benchmarks to U.S. GHG Emissions in 2020 (Tg CO2 eq) 
Target 
(Reduction over 
1990 by 2020) 





Target for U.S. 
2020 Emissions 
Reduction from 
BAU to Target 
EU  (20%)  6,109 8,483 4,887  42% 
EU  (30%)  6,109 8,483 4,276  50% 
California  (0%)  6,109 8,483 6,109  28% 
 
  As Table 2 demonstrates, extending the California target nationally would require a 
reduction of 28 percent in 2020 from what GHG emissions would otherwise have been.  
Applying the European benchmarks would necessitate even greater reductions – between 42 and 
50 percent.   These interim reductions are significant and immediately raise questions about their 
feasibility.  Accordingly, the scope for deep cuts in U.S. emissions is explored below on a sector 
by sector basis, using the same four sectors discussed in Section 2. 
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3.1 Scope for Deep Cuts in Emissions from Electric Power Generation 
 
  When it comes to limiting GHG emissions from electric power generation, there are three 
basic approaches, all of which will likely be required if the U.S. is to make deep cuts in its 
emissions.  The first is a substantial increase in electric end-use efficiency, thereby reducing the 
amount of electricity that is generated (and the associated carbon that is emitted).  The second is 
to reduce the carbon intensity of the fuel mix used to generate electricity, so that for any given 
amount of electricity produced, emissions are lower.  Finally, because fossil fuels will almost 
certainly be used in the U.S. for decades to come to generate electricity, options for capturing 
and sequestering carbon before it is emitted need to further developed and deployed.   
 
Demand Side:  Opportunities from End-Use Efficiency 
 
  The prospects for deep cuts in the use of electricity exist primarily in the buildings sector 
– both residential and commercial – and in the industrial sector.  Industrial energy efficiency is 
addressed in Section 3.2, so the discussion below focuses on the building sector and then reviews 





  In any particular location, the electricity consumed by a building – residential or 
commercial – is a function of both its shell integrity, meaning its ability to keep unwanted heat 
transfers in or out of the building, and the electrical equipment used in the building.  Buildings 
may be in use for up to 75 years and the equipment therein is typically in use for 10 to 30 years.   
Because retrofits to increase efficiency can be infeasible or costly, the most cost-effective means 
to improve efficiency is usually to initially build to high-efficiency specifications and to replace 
equipment and appliances at the end of their natural life with high-efficiency models.  Greater 
reductions could be achieved if existing capital stock were replaced immediately, but premature 
retirement of plant and equipment can drive up costs significantly. Some efficiency upgrades, 
however, like use of high efficiency lighting, programmable thermostats, and weatherization, 
offer a quick payback and don’t need to wait for building or equipment replacement.   
 
  The Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that if all future residential 
equipment purchases were of the most efficient models available in any given year (regardless of 
cost) and if, beginning in 2006, all homes were constructed to meet the highest efficiency 
criteria, then annual residential consumption of electricity would drop by 27 percent in 2020 
compared to the BAU forecast, and by 30 percent in 2030. 
 
  When it comes to commercial buildings, EIA estimates that if all future commercial 
equipment purchases were of the most efficient models available in any given year (regardless of 
cost) and if building shell efficiency of new and existing commercial buildings increased by 10.5 
percent and 7.5 percent, respectively, by 2030, then annual commercial consumption of 
electricity be 17 percent less in 2020 and 32 percent less in 2030 compared to business as usual.   
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series of policy and technical efficiency measures in the building sector (including both the 
residential and commercial sectors) could reduce CO2 emission by 23 percent over forecast levels 
in 2025.
 57  This estimate included reductions in use of electricity, gas, and oil while the two 
references above to EIA analyses are limited to electricity reductions.  Both are instructive 
regarding the scope for emission reductions in the buildings sector. 
 
  A number of policy tools can be used to reduce energy consumption through efficiency.
58  
Efficiency standards can be strengthened for appliances and other electronic equipment.  The 
Department of Energy, for example, already administers regulatory efficiency standards for 
appliances such as refrigerators, dishwashers, and water heaters and the EPA/DOE Energy Star 
program has set voluntary standards for televisions, computers, and other equipment.  There is 
also an Energy Star Homes program focused on efficiency in residential settings.  Such programs 
can be broadened and made more stringent.  In addition, building codes (typically enacted at the 
state or local level) can require that new buildings achieve a specific level of efficiency.  The 
federal government can encourage states and localities to adopt revised codes by providing 
technical support and training to designers, builders, and code officials and by potentially 
withholding federal funds from states that fail to update their codes.  Both DOE and EPA have 
substantial expertise – and existing programs – when it comes to energy efficiency in the 
residential, commercial, and industrial sectors that could be used to improve corporate, 
consumer, builder, and state/local government awareness of and implementation of energy 
efficiency measures.  These DOE and EPA programs could be expanded substantially. 
 
Combined Heat and Power / Distributed Generation 
 
  Other means of reducing the demand for centrally generated electricity include the use of 
combined heat and power (CHP) installations which use the waste heat from on-site (or local) 
electricity generation for industrial processes, heating, and cooling.  Another is distributed 
generation (DG) which entails generation of electricity and heat at or close to the point of use.  
Examples include rooftop solar panels, solar water heating, small-scale wind generation, 
stationary fuel cells, and geothermal heat pumps.  Low-carbon fuels like biomass and natural gas 
are also options for DG installations.  Because of the prospects to combine CHP and DG for 
maximum benefit, such project should be developed in tandem whenever feasible.   In many 
locations, regulatory barriers exist to the deployment of DG systems; streamlining and relaxing 
such regulations will stimulate additional DG installations. 
 
Supply Side:  Carbon Intensity of the Fuel Mix
59
 
  Coal provides the fuel source for about half of the electricity generated in the U.S.  
Because of its high carbon content, however, it is responsible for over 80 percent of the CO2 
emissions from power generation.  Accordingly, changing the mix of fuels used to generate 
power to less carbon-intensive sources offers significant opportunities for emission reductions. 
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  Natural Gas 
 
  Natural gas is already widely used in the U.S. to generate electricity.  The carbon content 
of natural gas is less than half that of coal per unit of energy supplied, making gas – especially 
gas used to fuel highly efficient natural gas combined cycle turbines – an attractive option from a 
climate change perspective.  Supply constraints and increased demand have, however, produced 
substantial gas price increases in recent years.  If gas were to become less costly, either through 
increased domestic supply or higher imports, its use to generate power could grow significantly.  
Options for doing so include rate incentives, streamlined permitting of gas pipelines and 
facilities, expedited construction of an Alaskan natural gas pipeline, enhanced gas infrastructure 
in the lower 48 states, increased access to gas on public lands, and expanded production from 
non-conventional sources such as coal bed methane, deep water and wells, and landfill gas.  
 
  Nuclear Power 
 
  Nuclear power – which emits no carbon – is currently used to produce about 20 percent 
of the electricity used in the U.S.  For nuclear power to materially reduce the overall carbon 
intensity of power generation, its use must be expanded significantly.
 60  The 2005 Energy Policy 
Act provided some incentives for expansion of nuclear power, including tax credits and loan 
guarantees, and risk protection to encourage new plant construction.  The production tax credit 
placed nuclear energy on equal footing with other sources of emission-free power, including 
wind and closed-loop biomass, with a tax credit of 1.8 cents per kilowatt-hour for 6000 MW of 
capacity from new nuclear power plants for their first eight years of operation. In addition, the 
bill extended the Price-Anderson Act, which limits liability and provides insurance, for 20 years. 
 
  Because no nuclear plants have been ordered in the U.S. since 1977, there is significant 
uncertainty about their cost.  If such costs were 10 percent lower than assumed in the BAU 
scenario, EIA estimates that more than twice as much nuclear generating capacity would be 
added between 2005 and 2030.
61  Further research on the current cost of constructing nuclear 
plants is needed to more accurately characterize emission reduction possibilities.  
 
  Significant increases in nuclear power, however, require resolution of multiple cost, 
safety, and waste storage issues.
62  To address concerns about proliferation of nuclear materials, 
the Federal government needs to work internationally to strengthen the world wide nuclear non-
proliferation regime; in addition, increased R&D on “once-through” nuclear fuel that is not re-
processed after its first use may yield technological solutions to proliferation concerns.  When it 
comes to spent fuel management and waste storage, the existing program could be expanded 
beyond its current focus on the Yucca Mountain site as the only option in the country for long-
term waste storage. 
 
  Renewable Energy 
 
  As noted in Section 2.1, there is little scope for expanding the use of hydropower in the 
U.S.  Three other sources of renewable energy – biomass, wind power, and solar photovoltaic 
power – do offer opportunities to reduce carbon emissions from electric power generation.  Bio-
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modest reductions in CO2 emissions.  Biomass can also be used in plants designed to burn all 
biomass.  In the long run, however, a recent study commissioned by the Pew Center on Global 
Climate Change concluded that “biomass use should be encouraged” but that “biomass is 
unlikely to play a dominant role in reducing GHG emissions from the electricity sector towards 
the middle of the century.”
63  That said, co-firing with biomass can be implemented quickly and 
at low cost; accordingly, it can play a key role in coming years as a transition strategy while 
other low-carbon technologies are developed and deployed.  In addition, because of the potential 
for DG to reduce electricity demand, biomass has an important role to play in U.S. emission 
reductions. 
 
  Wind power is cost competitive with fossil fired power generation, but it is intermittent 
due to variation in wind speeds.  Accordingly, it needs to be linked with more consistent, and 
expensive, sources of back-up generation, thereby pushing its cost above that of conventional 
fossil fuel.  In addition, there has been some public objection to the aesthetics of large scale wind 
power facilities.   
 
  Solar photovoltaic (PV) power also suffers from an intermittency problem because the 
sun does not shine all the time.  Without a basic technology breakthrough, it will remain cost-
ineffective for grid-connected applications.  EIA expects, however, that over the next 25 years, 
there will be some growth in central-station solar power and that small-scale customer-sited PV 
applications will grow rapidly.
64
 
  Continued research and development, and incentives for deployment, are necessary to 
stimulate substitution of renewable resources for carbon-intensive fuels in the generation of 
electricity.  One way of doing so is through the use of a national Renewable Portfolio Standard 
(RPS).  About two dozen states already have instituted RPS’s which require power generators to 
include a minimum fraction – typically between 10 and 20 percent – of renewable energy in their 
fuel mix.   A national RPS would further enhance efforts to promote renewable sources, although 
a national standard would need to recognize regional variations in the availability and feasibility 
of different renewable technologies, as well as existing state RPS programs. 
 
Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) 
 
  Irrespective of the success of energy efficiency programs and of efforts to reduce the 
carbon intensity of the fuel mix, fossil fuels will continue to provide a substantial source of 
electric power in the U.S.  To the extent that the carbon from such fuels can be captured and 
sequestered over the long term, rather than emitted, deep cuts in GHG emissions may be feasible.  
Accordingly, there is considerable interest in technologies to capture and sequester carbon.  
These technologies are in their infancy and have yet to be deployed commercially in the U.S. 
(other than in test applications).  CSS is therefore a long-term opportunity to reduce emissions. 
 
  The cost and efficiency of carbon capture technologies are likely to vary as a function of 
the underlying generation technology in use:  conventional coal-fired, integrated gasification 
combined cycle (IGCC), or natural gas fired combined cycle (NGCC).  A recent MIT study, 
“The Future of Coal,” cautions that because carbon capture technologies have not been 
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underway around the world, conclusions about the cost superiority of one approach over another 
are likely premature.  That notwithstanding, the MIT study argues that federal research 




  Once the carbon has been captured during power generation, it must be transported and 
sequestered in a location where it cannot be released to the atmosphere.  The Electric Power 
Research Institute notes that while the individual technologies likely to be used in the transport 
of captured carbon are proven, “integrating and deploying them on a massive scale will be a 
complex task.”
66   
 
  Current sequestration efforts are focused on injection into deep geological formations 
from which the carbon cannot escape.  The feasibility of sequestration needs to be confirmed by 
large scale demonstration projects in a range of geologic settings; the federal government has 
initiated work in this arena but it could be better funded, more effectively managed, and 
expedited.  In addition, to ensure the safety and effectiveness of sequestration, a regulatory 
program will be required to address site selection, design and operating requirements, 
monitoring, and public engagement.   
 
  The task of researching, developing, demonstrating, and deploying widespread carbon 
capture and sequestration is daunting.  It will require leadership, substantial funding, and 
engagement by stakeholders.  But its potential is profound.  The MIT Coal Study concludes 
“CO2 capture and sequestration is the critical enabling technology that would reduce CO2 
emissions significantly while also allowing coal to meet the world’s pressing energy needs.”
67   
 
  One note of caution, however, is offered by a recent study that estimates that CCS will 
not be commercially available for at least 15 years.
68  In the interim, other steps to enhance 
efficiency and reduce the carbon content of the fuel mix will be critically important to making 
the transition and also provide an insurance policy in case CCS encounters unforeseen technical 
or other difficulties that delay or prevent its widespread deployment. 
 
3.2 Scope for Deep Cuts in Emissions from the Transportation Sector
69
 
  While GHG emissions from the transportation sector are high and growing quickly, there 
are substantial opportunities to limit emissions in coming years.  A recent study concluded that 
CO2 emissions could be cut by 20 to 25 percent by 2015 and by 45 to 50 percent by 2030 relative 
to a future without additional efforts to control emissions.  Given underlying growth in 
transportation demand, CO2 emissions in 2030 would then be about the same as current levels.  
The primary technical means for achieving such reductions are increased efficiency and the use 
of alternative, lower-carbon, fuels and technologies.  In turn, such technical options can be 




24 April Working Draft - Page 22 of 49   By 2015, the fuel economy of light-duty vehicles can be increased by up to one-third with 
existing technology at a cost less than the value of the fuel saved.  By 2030, it is likely that fuel 
economy can be increased to significantly higher levels (50 – 100 percent) at possibly greater 
costs, depending on technological progress. Opportunities for increased fuel economy include 
improving energy efficiency of the drive train (engine and transmission and by reducing the 
amount of energy necessary to move the vehicle by reducing weight, aerodynamic drag, and 
rolling resistance).  A combination of technologies can increase engine efficiency by up to 25 
percent.   Opportunities exist to reduce vehicle weight with no loss of crash-worthiness or 
performance.   
 
  By combining both proven and near-term technologies (excluding weight reduction), a 
National Research Council study of fuel economy concluded that existing technologies could 
significantly reduce fuel consumption in 15 years, finding passenger fuel economy could be 
increased by 12 to 27 percent and light truck fuel economy by 25 to 42 percent (the ranges reflect 
the size of the cars and trucks from small to large).   Looking further into the future, greater 
increases in fuel economy could be achieved by 2020.   
 
Alternative Vehicle Technologies 
 
  Further improvements in hybrid design, compression-ignition diesels, and other 
technologies can stimulate advances.  For example, in hybrid vehicles, batteries allow energy 
captured during regenerative braking to be stored for use to power the electric motor and 
accessories.  Advanced hybrid designs coupled with continuously variable transmissions can 
improve fuel economy by 40 to 50 percent.  When it comes to diesel engines, American 
motorists often associate them with poor driving performance, soot, noise and unpleasant odors; 
however they are more energy efficient compared to gasoline powered cars.  Significant 
improvement in diesel engine and emissions control technology and fuels have improved 
performance and other environmental impacts. 
 
  Hydrogen-fueled and electric vehicles are also long-term options and can be powered by 
a variety of energy sources – including some fuels that do not contain any carbon and others that 
do.   Depending on the type of fuel used to generate them, such vehicles can substantially reduce 




  Alternative fuels such as liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), compressed natural gas (CNG), 
and biofuels can provide GHG benefits but face challenges.  LPG vehicles can reduce GHG 
emissions by almost 20 percent, however, quantities produced and reserves are relatively small.  
A vast natural gas supply infrastructure is an advantage for CNG, although there are limited 
refueling stations and concerns about safety.  Agriculture-based fuels, also known as biofuels, 
may offer promising opportunities to reduce emissions.
70   
 
  As a near-term option, there is significant enthusiasm in the U.S. for corn-based ethanol 
as a vehicle fuel.  The sources of feedstock (e.g., corn vs. switchgrass) and fuels used in ethanol 
production (e.g., coal vs. natural gas), however, have important implications for how climate-
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some experts claiming that it takes more energy to make ethanol than the fuel actually contains 
or that it merely breaks even.  While this was true early on, improvements in technology have 
turned ethanol into a net provider of energy, even from corn grain.  Although efficiency of grain-
based ethanol production has improved, fossil energy use is still high, and there is likely to be an 
upper limit on the amount of corn-grain ethanol that can be produced economically, currently 
estimated at 10 billion gallons per year (or less than 1% of current energy demand).   
 
  Looking to future, the energy balance from sources of ethanol other than corn (e.g., 
sugarcane or switchgrass) can be much better than that from corn ethanol.  A number of 
estimates of the GHG implications of using ethanol in cars and light trucks are available.  The 
degree of GHG savings closely tracks the savings in fossil fuel energy use.  Replacing gasoline 
with ethanol made from corn grains reduces GHG emissions by 20 to 40 percent, compared with 
savings of around 100 percent from ethanol made from Brazilian sugarcane or lignocellulosic 
biomass such as corn stover or energy crops. 
  
  Responsible use of agricultural residues like corn stover or wheat straw for biofuel 
production could supply 2 to 6 percent of current total US energy demand or 7 to 24 percent of 
total U.S. petroleum energy demand in the on-road transportation sector.  Production of energy 
crops such as switchgrass could displace an additional 3 percent of current energy supply while 
using roughly 10 percent of total US agricultural area.  Improvements in genetics could boost 
this up to 12 percent of supply using 15 percent of available land. 
 
  Research and development in the biofuels arena is moving quickly.  One example is a 
partnership between DuPont and BP to develop, produce, and market a next generation of 
biofuels. The two companies have been working together since 2003 to develop products that 
will overcome the limitations of existing biofuels. The first product to market will be biobutanol, 
which is targeted for introduction in 2007 in the U.K. as a gasoline bio-component. This biofuel 




  For all alternative fuels, a “wells to wheels” life cycle analysis is important in considering 
the relative climate benefits from any shift from gasoline to an alternative fuels. While an 
alternative fuel may reduce GHG emissions from the vehicle itself compared to use of gasoline, 
GHG emissions associated with the development, production, and distribution of the alternative 
fuel may be higher than those of gasoline, resulting in a net increase in total GHG emissions. 
When it comes to coal-to-liquids (CTL) technologies, for example, unless CO2 emissions are 
fully captured during creation of the fuel, CTL will increase GHG emissions because more 
emissions will be generated in producing fuel, and the same in driving the vehicle.   
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Policy Options in the Transportation Sector   
 
  Policies are critical to stimulating improvement in all sources of transportation emissions.  
Improved fuel efficiency standards for vehicles (e.g., CAFE standards) or GHG emissions 
standards could drive significant reductions in emissions.  Alternative fuels often require 
government involvement in providing consistent subsidies in the face of shifting petroleum 
prices, policy direction and building relevant infrastructure.  A price signal on gasoline from 
taxes or carbon caps will make low-carbon fuels more competitive and encourage choices of 
more efficient vehicles over time.  Land-use planning, congestion charges, and investment in 
public transportation – accompanied by public education are also critical to shaping behaviors. 
 
  In combination, such policies can make an important difference in overall emissions.  As 
noted at the outset of this section, emission reductions in the range of 20 to 25 percent are 
feasible by 2015.  In 2030, reductions could approach 50 percent. 
 
3.3 Scope for Deep Cuts in Emissions from the Manufacturing Sector 
 
  The manufacturing sector is a major contributor to U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.  Many 
industries within the sector are energy-intensive and create emissions directly thorough their own 
fossil fuel combustion or indirectly through the purchase of electricity from generators that emit 
GHGs.  In addition, the production technologies and practices employed by some industries 
create emissions directly 
from the production 
process itself.  As 
demonstrated by Table 3, 
the four manufacturing 
industries that emit more 
than 100 Tg of energy-
related CO2 per year 
collectively emit about 
57 percent of all 
manufacturing emissions.  As such, these industries deserve special attention when it comes to 
assessing the prospects for deep cuts in manufacturing emissions. 
Table 3 
Manufacturing Industries with More than  












Bulk Chemicals  330.7  24.0%  0.1% 
Petroleum Refining  224.5  16.3%  2.1% 
Iron and Steel  127.3  9.2%  0.3% 
Paper 104.1  7.5%  0.2% 
 
  Over the past two years, the Department of Energy’s Office of Energy Efficiency and 
Renewable Energy has commissioned a series of studies on the “bandwidth,” or opportunity, for 
energy savings potential in each of several U.S. industries.  Typically, these studies begin by 
estimating – for a particular industry and the processes it uses – the current actual energy used at 
the average U.S. plant.  Next, the best practice energy use that would result if state of the art, 
commercially available technologies were used in all U.S. plants is determined.  Another way to 
think about the best practice energy use scenario is that it implies all U.S. plants operate at a 
“best in the world” level when it comes to energy use.  Finally, the bandwidth studies determine 
the practical minimum energy needed to carry out a particular manufacturing process using 
technologies and practices that still require additional research and development (i.e., are under 
development or that have been developed but are not yet commercially viable).   
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results of these bandwidth 
studies for the four U.S. 
manufacturing industries 
with the highest levels of 
energy-related CO2 
emissions.   Energy savings 
associated with bringing all 
U.S. plants to a “best in the 
world” level range from 18 
to 26 percent depending on 
the industry.
78  When it 
comes to achieving the 
practical minimum energy use, three of the four industries could save about 39 percent of current 
energy used while the fourth – bulk chemicals – could achieve savings of 71 percent.  By 
definition, such savings require continued investment in research and development, and success 
in deploying as-yet-unproven technologies in the field.  Nonetheless, these results are indicative 
of the scope for deep cuts in energy use and reductions in GHG emissions from the U.S. 
manufacturing sector. 
Table 4 































77 2,361 TBtu/yr  1,749 TBtu/yr  1,447 TBtu/yr 
(-26%)  (-39%) 
 
  It is also important to note, however, that DOE’s bandwidth studies generally do not 
quantify the economic impact or return on investment of these energy saving approaches.  While 
energy saving measures do reduce a firm’s energy costs, most require an upfront investment.  In 
addition, most manufacturing processes are capital intensive and rely on long-lived plant and 
equipment.  While smaller changes can be made relatively quickly and may yield compensating 
savings, significant process changes often have to wait until the facilities require major overhaul 
or are expanded to increase capacity.  For competitive reasons – both domestic and international 
– firms are often reluctant to go it alone in making investments that other firms are not 
compelled to also make, unless there is a relatively quick payback.  
 
  Another avenue for energy-
related emissions savings comes 
from the sector’s purchases of 
electricity from commercial 
generators.  As shown in Table 5, 
such purchases can represent a 
significant fraction of an industry’s 
energy use and indirect greenhouse 
gas emissions.  Because they are 
buyers, rather than producers, 
manufacturers typically have little 
control over the fuel mix or carbon content of the electricity they purchase.  As such, the 
prospects for deep cuts in GHG emissions from the manufacturing sector are indirectly linked to 
prospects for cuts in emissions from electricity generation (for example, as discussed in Section 
3.1.2, through fuel switching or use of carbon capture and sequestration). 
Table 5 















Bulk Chemicals  2,516.6  463.6  18.4% 
Petroleum Refining  3,717.8  132.1  3.6% 
Iron and Steel  1,365.0  190.8  14.0% 
Paper 2,265.4  224.7  9.9% 
 
24 April Working Draft - Page 26 of 49   Another opportunity for significant cuts in manufacturing emissions is in the cement 
industry which is both very energy-intensive and one of the country’s biggest sources of process 
emissions.  The industry’s annual process emissions are 46 Tg CO2
80 and its energy use accounts 
for another 40 Tg CO2
81 per year.  The process of creating cement from raw materials entails the 
calcination of limestone to form clinker (the primary ingredient in cement.)  The calcination 
process releases CO2  3 from the limestone as CaCO  is converted to CaO.  Because there appear to 
be no feasible options for reducing process emissions per unit of clinker produced, prospects for 
emission reduction rest on approaches that reduce the amount of clinker in finished cement.  
Pozzolanic additives such as fly ash, blast furnace slag, silica fume, and volcanic ash, can reduce 
the proportion of clinker in cement.
82  The U.S., however, lags behind many foreign countries in 
the use of such additives.
83  Ground limestone can also be combined with clinker to produce 
cement.
84  A recent revision of a major industry standard (ASTM-C 150) allows up to 5 percent 
ground limestone to be added to cement, but the practice has yet to widely penetrate the industry 
because another U.S. standard setting organization – one responsible for cement specifications 
for public transportation projects – has yet to adopt the ASTM standard.
85
 
  When it comes to energy-related emissions from cement manufacture, the LBNL study 
cited above is noteworthy.
86  The study reviewed over 40 energy efficient technologies and 
measures across all phases of the cement manufacturing process including raw materials 
preparation, clinker making, and finish grinding.  The LBNL study concluded that “there is 
ample room for energy efficiency improvement.  … Substantial potential for energy efficiency 
improvement exists in the cement industry, and in individual plants.”  The study did, however, 
caution that such improvements may only be achievable in conjunction with natural turnover of 
capital plant and equipment, or during plant expansions. 
 
3.4 Scope for Deep Cuts in Emissions from the Agriculture Sector
87
 
  Nitrous oxide and methane emissions result from both crop and livestock operations and 
account for approximately 80 percent of U.S. agricultural greenhouse gas emissions on a GWP 
basis.  Despite challenges, there is considerable scope for reducing these emissions.  Nitrous 
oxide constitutes the largest agricultural source of GHG emissions in terms of warming potential 
(48 percent), and almost 70 percent of total U.S. nitrous oxide emissions are from soils.  The best 
option for reducing these emissions is to use fertilizers more efficiently; adoption of best 
fertilization practices could reduce agricultural N2O emissions by 30 to 40 percent.
88  Livestock 
are the main source of agricultural CH4 emissions.  Increasing the efficiency of production per 
animal can decrease these emissions and also reduce costs.  Manure management accounts for 25 
percent of U.S. agricultural CH4 emissions; anaerobic (i.e., oxygen-free) digesters that capture 
and use the methane as an energy source—thereby displacing fossil fuels – offer a good solution 
to these emissions.  Adoption of best practices could reduce total U.S. agricultural methane 
emissions by 20 to 40 percent.
89  
 
In addition to options to reduce agricultural emissions, it is technically feasible that 70 to 
220 million metric tons (MMT) of carbon could be added to U.S. agricultural soils annually over 
two to three decades.  This would remove 260 to 810 MMT of carbon dioxide from the 
atmosphere annually, offsetting 4 to 11 percent of current U.S. GHG emissions.  Economic 
potential to store carbon varies substantially by region, and current studies suggest that at prices 
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limited to 70 MMT per year.   
 
If an aggressive research and development (R&D) program succeeds in substantially 
improving per-acre yields of energy crops and reducing costs of conversion technologies, 
biomass from agricultural sources could supply up to 19 percent of total current U.S. energy 
consumption.  This would yield GHG savings on the order of 180 to 470 MMT of carbon, which 
is equivalent to reducing CO2 emissions by 670 to 1,710 MMT CO2 per year (by substituting for 
fossil fuels) or 9 to 24 percent of total U.S. year-2004 GHG emissions.  
 
  Overall, studies so far indicate that agriculture is likely to be a competitive supplier of 
emission reductions if and when farmers are offered suitable payments.  Among agricultural 
mitigation options, soil carbon sequestration will likely be most significant for lower carbon 
prices (less than $50 per metric ton of carbon or $13 per metric ton of CO2).  At higher prices, 
afforestation and biofuel options become increasingly more competitive.   
 
4. State and Regional Initiatives
90
 
  The past six years have provided a window of opportunity for state leadership on climate 
policy.  With federal policy stalled, increasing scientific certainty that humans are contributing to 
a changing climate, and a steady groundswell of public opinion favoring action, many US states 
have found a supportive constituency and clear justification for action on climate change.  Many 
policymakers have seized on this opportunity to take action on climate change using a variety of 
methods, from directly reducing greenhouse gas emissions from electricity generation and 
transportation, to indirectly reducing GHG emissions by setting energy efficiency standards, to 
providing incentives for deploying climate-friendly technologies. 
 
  Such experimentation has followed the traditional federalist path of environmental 
policymaking in the United States.  States have often been “laboratories” of possible federal 
action -- creating policies that may lead by example and inform through experimentation.  
Simultaneously, by creating a “patchwork” of regulatory regimes for companies operating in 
multiple states, the leadership of states often catalyzes calls for more uniform federal action. 
 
  Across the country, legislators and governors have undertaken strategies to reduce their 
states’ greenhouse gas emissions.  California has the most comprehensive and aggressive state 
effort, and some other states are not far behind in addressing emissions from across the economy.  
Emerging regional climate initiatives allow states to pool their resources, achieve greater 
emission reductions, and provide the federal government with blueprints for action.  The highest 
concentrations of activity occur in Western and Northeastern states that are traditional 
environmental leaders, but some “unusual suspects” are also tackling climate change individually 




  California’s recent climate initiatives demonstrate the state’s continued leadership in 
environmental policy.  Over the past four years, California pioneered vehicle greenhouse gas 
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GHG performance standards for long-term electricity contracts (SB 1368) and transportation 
fuels.  California’s vehicle standard requires a 30% reduction in GHG emissions from new 
vehicles by 2016; more than a dozen states will adopt the standard if it survives legal challenge 
by auto manufacturers. With the passage of AB 32, the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, 
California set an enforceable target of achieving 1990 levels of greenhouse gas emissions by 
2020.  The legislation gives the California Air Resources Board responsibility for adopting the 
necessary measures to achieve the target and allows the use of market mechanisms such as cap 
and trade.  An executive order by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger established a committee to 
advise California on greenhouse gas market design. 
  California’s GHG emissions performance standard for electricity, SB 1368, has received 
less public attention than the Global Warming Solutions Act, but it has important implications 
for power generation in the West.  The law directs the California Energy Commission to set a 
greenhouse gas performance standard for electricity procured under any new long-term contract 
by local publicly-owned utilities by June 30
th, 2007, whether the power is generated within state 
borders or imported from plants in other states.  The standard will drive low-carbon electric 
generation, including research and investment in coal power plants that capture and store carbon 
dioxide, as generators in states that export electricity to California seek to comply.   
  In addition, Governor Schwarzenegger pledged in January that he would apply the 
world’s first Low Carbon Fuel Standard to transportation fuels sold in California, with the goal 
of reducing the carbon intensity of California’s passenger vehicle fuels at least 10 percent by 
2020.  The standard applies to the so-called “well-to-wheel” lifecycle emissions of fuel, 
providing both an incentive for GHG emission reductions in petroleum processing as well as for 
an increase in the use of biofuels and electricity as transportation energy sources.  This approach 
to reducing fuel carbon content represents an innovative step beyond previous transportation 
initiatives focusing on fuel efficiency.   
Regional Initiatives 
 
  Climate policy provides a welcome forum for interstate cooperation because the 
geographic location of an emissions reduction is immaterial, and states can combine purchasing 
power, analytic capacity, and reduction opportunities to their mutual benefit.  Greenhouse gases 
mix rapidly in the atmosphere, so a ton of CO2 from Sacramento has the same effect on the 
global climate as a ton from Albany.  For cap-and-trade programs, more participants lower the 
cost of achieving a given level of emission reduction by providing additional opportunities for 
reductions.  Increasing the number of participants also reduces the possibility of emissions 
increasing in states or sectors not included in the cap.  For instance, this process of “leakage” 
could occur if a cap results in a shift of electricity generation to uncapped states, thus negating 
some of the program’s actual emission reductions.  
 
  The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is establishing the first mandatory U.S. 
cap-and-trade program for carbon dioxide, which currently includes ten Northeastern and Mid-
Atlantic States.  The governors of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, and Vermont established RGGI in December 2005.  Massachusetts and Maryland 
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Additional states can join the program with the agreement of the participating states.  RGGI sets 
a cap on carbon dioxide emissions from power plants and allows sources to trade emission 
allowances. The program will cap emissions at current levels in 2009 and then reduce emissions 
10% by 2019.  Each state that intends to participate in RGGI must adopt a model rule through 
legislation or regulation and determine how to distribute emissions allowances.  Indeed, each 
member state has agreed to set aside 25% of its emission allowances for public benefit.  One of 
the major developments in RGGI has been proposals by New York, Massachusetts, Maine and 
Vermont to auction 100% of their emission allowances rather than directly allocating allowances 
to covered entities.  Federal policymakers may look to states’ allocation decisions to inform their 
own allocation choices.  The RGGI states are also considering options for addressing emissions 
leakage (that is, energy coming from neighboring uncapped states) but have not yet settled on an 
approach.  
  On February 26, 2007, Governors Janet Napolitano of Arizona, Arnold Schwarzenegger 
of California, Bill Richardson of New Mexico, Ted Kulongoski of Oregon, and Christine 
Gregoire of Washington signed an agreement establishing the Western Regional Climate Action 
Initiative, a joint effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and address climate change.  Under 
the agreement, the five states will jointly set a regional emissions target within six months, and 
will establish a market-based system by August 2008 to meet the target, such as a cap-and-trade 
program covering multiple economic sectors.  This ambitious schedule will coincide with the 
implementation of AB 32 in California, and the coordination of these efforts could present 
challenges for the states.   
State Action: Usual and Unusual Suspects 
 
  State action on climate change has moved beyond the usual coastal suspects of California 
and New England.  Recent executive orders by the Governors of New Jersey, Illinois, and 
Washington bring the number of states with emission targets to fourteen.  Over a dozen states 
have active legislative commissions or Governor advisory councils charged with developing a 
climate strategy, including Alaska, Montana, and North and South Carolina.  In the most recent 
examples of states adopting and strengthening their renewable requirements, Minnesota and New 
Mexico have both passed expanded Renewable Portfolio Standards.  Twenty-three states and the 
District of Columbia have set these standards specifying that electric utilities generate a certain 
amount of electricity from renewable sources.  States (and many municipalities) are moving on 
other fronts in the absence of federal action, creating appliance efficiency standards, encouraging 
renewable fuel sources, and improving the carbon footprint of state fleets and government 
buildings.    
 
  States have already built a sizable knowledge base that will be vital to federal 
policymakers negotiating the passage of climate bills.  For example, RGGI has considered many 
of the cap and trade design decisions relevant to federal policy, such as the inclusion of emission 
offsets, allocation of emission allowances, and cost containment mechanisms.   
  
  State experiments with policy approaches to climate change have done much to show that 
strong leadership on climate policy can be politically attractive and technically feasible.  Some 
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gas cap-and-trade system, renewable portfolio standard, and GHG emission registry could build 
directly on existing state models with only slight modifications.  Innovative state actions to 
address climate change will provide both early lessons and a strong impetus for federal policy.   
 
5. Corporate Initiatives  
 
  Major U.S. businesses increasingly believe that climate change regulations are inevitable 
and are responding by engaging in the policy arena. Some of the most progressive companies are 
openly calling for national greenhouse gas emissions limits, while other businesses and trade 
associations have been transitioning away from their historical stances against mandatory climate 
policies to a more neutral position. The shifting winds in the business community are both a 
reaction to and a driver of increased congressional action on climate change.  On one hand, the 
priority given to the issue by the new Democratic leadership in the 110
th Congress has convinced 
the corporate world that it needs to get involved in the debate or risk being left behind as crucial 
policy decisions get hashed out. On the other hand, support from the business community is 
necessary to provide enough votes in Congress to enact mandatory national climate change 
legislation. 
 
The U.S. Climate Action Partnership 
 
  One visible example of corporate engagement in US policymaking came with the January 
2007 announcement of a U.S. Climate Action Partnership (or “US CAP”).   US CAP is an 
unprecedented alliance of ten major companies (Alcoa, BP America, Caterpillar, Duke Energy, 
DuPont, FPL Group, GE, Lehman Brothers, PG&E and PNM Resources) and four leading NGOs 
(Environmental Defense, Natural Resources Defense Council, the Pew Center and the World 
Resources Institute).  US CAP is a nonpartisan effort, driven by the top executives from member 
organizations—companies with a combined market capitalization of more than $750 billion and 
environmental and climate groups with global policy influence and more than one million 
members worldwide.  This unique collaboration involving business and NGO leaders sends a 
clear message to lawmakers that America needs national policies to address climate change now.  
 
  The group’s work is the result of an intense, year-long collaboration.  The report, titled A 
Call for Action, was released in January 2007.  The coalition was founded with the shared goal 
of slowing, stopping and reversing the growth of greenhouse gas emissions over the shortest 
period of time reasonably achievable, and the rapid enactment of federal climate legislation.  Its 
recommendations are stronger and more specific than any business group has ever been on 
climate policy in the U.S.  Together, the US CAP members announced their shared support of 
not only principles but also specific policy recommendations aimed at preserving the option of 
450 - 550 ppm CO2 levels globally. 
 
US CAP’s recommendations are based on six guiding principles.  These principles state 
that sensible climate legislation must do the following:  
 
•  Account for the global dimensions of climate change;  
•  Recognize the importance of technology;  
24 April Working Draft - Page 31 of 49 •  Be environmentally effective;  
•  Create economic opportunity and advantage;  
•  Be fair to sectors disproportionately impacted; and  
•  Recognize and encourage early action.  
 
  US CAP urges policy makers to enact a policy framework for mandatory reductions of 
GHG emissions from major emitting sectors, including large stationary sources and 
transportation, and energy use in commercial and residential buildings. The cornerstone of this 
economy-wide approach would be a cap-and-trade program that ensures emission reduction 
targets will be met while simultaneously generating a price signal for greenhouse gases.  This 
price signal will stimulate investment and innovation in the technologies necessary to achieve 
our environmental goal, which is to stabilize atmospheric GHG concentrations at between 450-
550 parts per million—a level that minimizes large-scale adverse impacts to humans and the 
natural environment.   
 
  Achieving this goal will require a fundamental transformation of the energy system over 
the long-term, yet it cannot be predicted with accuracy all the technological developments 
between now and 2100.  Legislation should focus on what we know can be cost-effectively 
achieved over the next 20-30 years while putting us on a trajectory for deeper emissions 
reductions by mid-century.  Accordingly, A Call for Action recommends Congress establish the 
following specific short- and mid-term emission reduction targets:  
 
•  Between 100–105 percent of today’s levels within five years of rapid enactment 
•  Between 90–100 percent of today’s levels within ten years of rapid enactment 
•  Between 70–90 percent of today’s levels within fifteen years of rapid enactment 
•  Congress should specify an emission target zone aimed at reducing emissions by 
60 to 80 percent from current levels by 2050. 
 
Additional Corporate Actions 
 
  Following the widely publicized US CAP announcement, other firms and trade 
associations began to take more constructive positions on policy issues.  For example, the 
President of Public Service Enterprise Group (PSEG), parent company of New Jersey’s biggest 
utility, testified before a House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee that greenhouse gas 
reductions should be mandatory and should be achieved by a system of caps and pollution 
trading. In addition, the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, which represents General 
Motors, Ford Motor Company, and others and has historically resisted carbon caps, released a 
statement that there “needs to a be a national, federal, economy-wide approach to addressing 
greenhouse gases.”
91  In addition, in February 2007, the Electric Power Supply Association 
(trade association for competitive suppliers of electricity) announced their support for 
“comprehensive, mandatory federal legislation to require steps to minimize the impact of 
greenhouse gases on the environment.”
92
 
  Movement can also be seen on the financial front, as mainstream investors such as 
Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, and Citigroup are adopting guidelines for 
lending and asset management aimed at promoting clean-energy and climate-friendly 
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invest in renewable energy and energy efficiency projects, as well as exploring investment 
opportunities in cleaner burning alternative fuels such as renewable diesel, ethanol, and biomass.  
In March 2007, Bank of America announced a $20 billion initiative to help foster green business 
practices. The bank says it will set aside funds to lend to companies offering environmentally 
superior services and products, and offer lower mortgage rates on energy-efficient homes. 
 
  The recently proposed $45 billion buyout of TXU, a major Texas electric utility 
company, by two private equity groups and related decision to scale back proposed coal-fired 
power plant construction provides compelling evidence that the financial world is taking the 
risks from climate change seriously. As part of the proposed deal, which has been endorsed by 
the Natural Resources Defense Council and Environmental Defense, the private equity firms 
have agreed to significantly reduce the number of proposed new coal-fired power plants, to 
support federal climate protection legislation, to invest hundreds of millions of dollars in 
demand-side management initiatives, and to work to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 
levels by 2020.  The deal reflects the growing certainty within the business and financial 
community that carbon emissions will eventually be regulated. The TXU deal is just one 
example of a business that is positioning itself to prosper in an environment where carbon 
emissions have a price tag attached to them.  
 
6. Prospects for U.S. Policy  
 
As evidenced by the preceding section, pressure is mounting for a comprehensive, 
mandatory federal response to climate change in the U.S.  One of the leading contenders for a 
U.S. policy approach is cap and trade.  An emerging policy is likely to be informed by previous 
efforts to control traditional air pollutants (such as sulfur dioxide (SO2) in controlling acid rain), 
as well as international (the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme) and emerging 
regional market-based efforts (RGGI, California, Chicago Climate Exchange) to address climate 
change.  The experience with these will likely inform the design of a cap-and-trade program 
should that be the favored approach. 
 
  The U.S. launched the first national emissions trading program under the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990 to curb sulfur dioxide emissions that cause acid rain. This program is 
credited with achieving substantial environmental benefits at less than half the costs of 
traditional command and control regulation.
93  The U.S.’s SO2 trading program has served as a 
model for GHG trading proposals.  
 
The European Union (EU) now boasts the largest emissions market for carbon under its 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS).  Approximately 11,500 installations in 25 EU Member 
States were covered under the first phase of the program – amounting to roughly one half of the 
EU’s carbon dioxide emissions.  Combined with other policy efforts, the EU-ETS is providing a 
mechanism to assist the EU in meeting its Kyoto Protocol target. 
 
  In North America, a voluntary pilot market was created through the Chicago Climate 
Exchange (CCX).  CCX provides a GHG trading system for entities willing to sign up for 
contractually binding reductions.  Emissions reductions targets are modest, and prices have 
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anticipating a domestic market.  State and regional trading programs (discussed in Section 4) are 
also building support for a national trading-based program although important questions about 
harmonizing programs and linkage must be resolved.  
 
  These programs and others will provide foundation and insight for federal policy 
proposals.  These proposals are discussed more fully in the sections that follow an exploration of 
current U.S. policy. 
 
Existing Federal Initiatives 
  
  In 2002, President Bush announced his program of voluntary intensity-based targets, 
revisiting voluntary reporting protocols and R&D.  His intensity target provided for growth in 
emissions through 2012 (beyond his term in office), as discussed in Section 1.2.  The inadequacy 
of the Bush program for achieving real reductions was apparent from the outset and pressure has 
been mounting for further action.  Voices ranging from the business community,
94 to evangelical 
Christians,
95 to military leaders,
96 are calling for absolute cuts in emissions.  Coupled with state 
action, growing public concern, the recent takeover of Congress by the Democratic Party, and 
mounting scientific evidence, this support is stirring record movement on Capitol Hill. 
 
  The first vote on a federal cap and trade program for greenhouse gas emissions took place 
in October 2003, on the Climate Stewardship Act sponsored by Senators John McCain 
(Republican of Arizona) and Joseph Lieberman (then Democrat of Connecticut).  The bill was 
less aggressive than the Kyoto Protocol limits in that it called for a return of greenhouse has 
emissions to 2000 levels by 2010 rather than cutting emissions to 7 percent below 1990 levels by 
2012.  Despite the bill’s moderation, many environmental groups endorsed it and the bill won the 
support of 43 Senators.   
 
  The Climate Stewardship Act was reintroduced in February 2005 with a new technology 
title that included support for low-GHG technologies, including subsidies for advanced nuclear 
power plants.  Four Senators supporting the previous version of the bill opposed this new version 
due to its support for nuclear power, and it lost in a vote of 38 – 60.  However, in the same 
Congress, Senator Bingaman offered a resolution (S Res. 866) expressing the sense of the Senate 
that Congress should enact a comprehensive and effective national program of mandatory, 
market-based limits and incentives that slow, stop, and reverse the growth of GHG emissions.  
The Resolution said this goal should be achieved in a manner that will not significantly harm the 
US economy and will encourage comparable actions by other nations that are major trading 
partners and key contributors to emissions.  The Senate Resolution passed with a vote of 54-43, 
putting the Senate on record in support of mandatory climate change mitigation for the first time. 
 
Measures under Consideration 
 
  A new version of the Lieberman-McCain bill as well as several alternatives addressing 
climate change have been introduced in recent months. Most are designed as economy-wide cap-
and-trade programs. The new Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act (S. 280) provides for 
phased emissions reductions over a longer period of time, increases the offsets available, and 
24 April Working Draft - Page 34 of 49 24 April Working Draft - Page 35 of 49 
retains the technology titles.  One bill (S. 317) introduced by Senators Feinstein and Carper is 
focused on setting up a cap-and-trade program for the utility sector.  Only one (Senator 
Bingaman’s discussion draft) allows for continued emissions growth through an intensity-based 
target and a “safety valve” (or price cap).  A low safety valve may compromise the 
environmental target and hinder linkage to other global trading programs. 
 
  The Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act (S. 309) introduced by Senators Sanders 
and Boxer is based on California targets and timetables (reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 
1990 levels by 2020).  Many of the bills provide flexibility in trading across time periods, 
sectors, and greenhouse gases, and some provide for offsets (including international offsets).  
Key variables, such as how permits under the cap are distributed (auction vs. free allocation); 
whether the allocations are based on historic emissions or input-based; and whether and to what 
extent offsets are included, are handled differently across proposals, with some refraining from 
making these political decisions for now. 
 
  While there is growing support for a GHG cap-and-trade program (see Table 6 for 
pending legislative proposals as of April 2007), it is possible that other regulatory tools will be 
considered.  Recently, there have been discussions of a possible carbon tax.  Taxes provide a 
market signal and may be suitable for some applications – including for parts of the economy 
that do not lend themselves to cap and trade.  Revenues from taxes could theoretically be 
recycled, given to consumers to offset energy prices, or invested in technology.  Limitations of 
this approach include a lack of the environmental certainty afforded by quantity-based emissions 
caps, lack of market opportunities that cap-and-trade provides firms that can sell allowances, and 
the inability to link with a global system.  Taxes are also generally politically unpopular in the 
U.S. and it is also unclear how taxes will be shifted to provide the theoretical relief from existing 
obligations as new revenues are generated from this mechanism. 
 
  Other complementary policies are being considered.  There is also an important role for 
efficiency and performance standards in some sectors: for example, for automobiles and 
appliances.  Indeed, a comprehensive policy approach that includes both mandates and support 
for innovative technology is needed to achieve absolute reductions in emissions. 
 
  Between January and April 2007, there have been approximately 50 climate-related 
hearings in the U.S. Congress.  As shown in Table 6, several bills have been submitted, and more 
are expected. 
 
Political Constraints: Cost and Competitiveness Concerns   
 
  Historically, U.S. concerns about moving forward with a domestic program have focused 
on economic impacts and competitiveness (particularly the lack of emissions reductions 
requirements placed on developing countries such as China and India). 
 
  While the U.S. ratified the UNFCCC under the first President Bush in 1992 with the goal 
of returning emissions to 1990 levels, U.S. emissions have continued to grow steadily (now 16% 
above 1990 levels).  In 2001, the second President Bush abandoned the Kyoto Protocol 
negotiations and his campaign pledge to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide from utilities, citing the California energy crisis, lack of developing country targets, and potential for adverse 
economic impacts.  U.S. disengagement from the international efforts spurred action by other 
countries and helped catalyze the Protocol’s eventual entry into force without the United States. 
 
  The Kyoto Protocol was never offered up for a Senate confirmation vote by either the 
Clinton or Bush Administrations.  In large measure, this reflects the fact that prior to negotiation 
of the Kyoto Protocol, the Byrd/Hagel resolution unanimously passed the U.S. Senate.  This 
resolution (S. Res. 98) expressed the sense of the Senate that the U.S. should not be a signatory 
to any protocol or other agreement which would limit developed countries’ GHG emissions 
unless the treaty also “mandate[d] new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce GHG 
emissions for developing country parties within the same compliance period.” In addition, it 
stipulated that any agreement or mandate should not result in serious harm to the economy of the 
United States. In the face of overwhelming support for the resolution, the Clinton Administration 
chose to avoid an embarrassing defeat by urging its Senate allies to support the resolution but 
claim a broader interpretation of the language.  As a result, the Byrd-Hagel resolution passed 
unanimously, 95-0. 
 
Concerns about costs and competitiveness persist.  Bills vary in how they address these 
concerns.  Economic impacts could be mitigated through the scope and timing of the program, 
allowing trading across sectors, use of offsets and international trading, or a safety valve.  
Competitiveness impacts are taken into account in allocation of permits in at least one bill (the 
Climate Stewardship Act) and explicitly by requiring comparable steps in a reasonable 
timeframe (Bingaman discussion draft).  Additional options – ranging from technology support 
to border adjustments -- are being considered. 
 
  It is interesting to note that while the US CAP acknowledges the need for a global 
response to a global problem such as climate change, the companies and NGOs stopped short of 
saying commitments should be comparable.  In fact, they call on the U.S. to take the lead on 
enacting a mandatory climate policy.  Similarly, a report released in April 2007 by the National 
Commission on Energy Policy expresses the view that “rapidly industrializing but still far poorer 
nations are likely to accept emissions limits only after the United States and other wealthy 
countries have demonstrated a willingness to take the lead.”
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  The next section addresses one of these issues -- economic implications -- in greater 
detail.
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Greenhouse Gas Cap-And-Trade Proposals in the 110
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Table 6  
  
 
7.  Economic Impact of Emissions Cuts
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  A common argument for not taking action—or at least delaying action—on climate 
change is that the cost of action is too high.  President Bush, for example, justified rejecting the 
Kyoto Protocol because of the expense, stating that it would cost the U.S. $400 billion and 4.9 
million jobs.
99   The American Council for Capital Formation (ACCF), an industry funded 
advocacy group, also often cites high cost, job losses, and damaging economic consequences, as 
justification for rejecting any type of mandatory climate policy at the state or federal level.
100     
 
  Economic models typically provide the foundation for these high cost projections but it is 
important to realize that a variety of models have been used to predict the implications of climate 
policy and not all suggest devastating consequences.  While models have much to offer the 
policy realm, their results are only as reliable as the assumptions, the data, and the model 
structure allow.  Unfortunately, many of the models which have looked at climate policy have 
been limited in scope, make draconian assumptions about our ability to change and lead to 
results which suggest that any effort is too costly.  Furthermore, these models have typically 
done a poor job of accounting for the long-term benefits of taking action (i.e., avoiding the 
damages of climate change) and in many cases, these benefits are not even included and so are 
one-sided in their approach.  In fact, as the science becomes more compelling and actual impacts 




Economic Models of Climate Policy 
 
  Hundreds of analyses, using a variety of economic models and assumptions about how 
the economy will behave, how technology will develop, etc. have been published on the 
macroeconomic implications of climate policy in the last decade.
102   Many of the initial cost 
estimates of climate policy looked at economy-wide implications associated with implementation 
of the Kyoto Protocol.  The Protocol requires developed countries to reduce emissions on 
average 5% and the U.S. to reduce its emissions on average 7% below 1990 emission levels 
during the 2008-2012 timeframe.
103  A wide range of cost projections associated with meeting 
the Kyoto target were produced by Computerized General Equilibrium (CGE) models – also 
known as “top down” models -- in the late 1990s.    CGE models are composed of systems of 
mathematical equations and large amounts of data that refer to separate but connected elements 
relevant to the entire economy, like production and consumption; inputs of capital, labor, and 
energy; investment; taxes; etc. 
 
  In 2010, the studies projected that the price of one metric ton of carbon would range from 
$23/ton to $393/ton.  The projected range of impacts on GDP was predicted to be similarly 
diverse.  In 2010, GDP impacts relative to our projected GDP without Kyoto ranged from +0.15 
percent at the low end, suggesting economic gains from the policy to - 4.2 percent at the high end 
of costs.   
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consequences of the more moderate domestic climate policy.  For example, various versions of 
the bill sponsored by Senators’ McCain and Lieberman – known as the Climate Stewardship Act 
(SA2028) of 2004 and a revised version known as the Stewardship and Innovation Act (S1151) 
of 2005 have been analyzed.  The cap required by these proposals was stabilization of year 2000 
emission levels by 2010.   
  Because of the assumptions and the inherent differences in the model used, the ranges of 
impacts suggested by the economic models vary widely, as they did for the Kyoto Protocol 
impacts. Carbon price estimates in 2010 ranged from the low Tellus estimate of $29/ton to the 
high CRA estimate of $69/ton. The range was even wider in terms of the expected impact on 
economic activity.  CRA projected that the economy would lose $311 billion per year by 2020; 
in contrast, Tellus projected that the economy would see a net benefit of $30 billion.   
 
  It is important to note that these models project economic impacts against a baseline of 
anticipated strong economic growth.  Hence, projections of economic losses are relative to 
expected improvements in GDP – and do not represent absolute reductions from current 
economic performance.  Rather, they suggest that economic growth will be tempered by a price 
on carbon or GHG emissions.  Further, economic models only estimate how the economy will 
perform given very specific assumptions and only as allowed by the structure of the model.  As 
can be seen from the previous examples, different assumptions and different structures yield very 
different results.   
 
  Again, because of the assumptions and the inherent differences in the model used, the 





  In general, estimates of the costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the various 
models depends critically on the assumptions about how the economy works and how the 
following elements are represented:  (1) the degree of foresight that decision-makers have in the 
marketplace; (2) the degree of flexibility in the economy (how easily it can adapt to change); (3) 
how technological change is characterized; (4) the sensitivity of energy demand to price changes; 
(5) the specific policies included; (6) how economy and environment will perform in the absence 
of climate policy (the baseline or reference case); and (7) whether the benefits of avoided climate 
damage are included.  With respect to how the above elements impact the modeling results of 
climate policies, Weyant found generally that: 
•  the more optimistic models are about the degree of flexibility in the economy (ease of 
substitution between old and new technologies), the lower the economic impact; 
•  the more responsive emission reductions are to energy price increases, the lower the costs;  
•  including the impacts of induced technological change will have modest impacts in the short 
run but more significant impacts in the longer term; 
•  how revenues raised through carbon taxes are reused will affect program costs;  
24 April Working Draft - Page 39 of 49 •  the lower the assumed baseline or reference case forecast of emissions, the lower the cost of 
achieving any specific target (but this may also decrease reduction options); 
•  the more the model accounts for the benefits of emissions reductions, the lower the net 
economic impact; and finally 
•  assumptions about the specific policies included – in particular, the inclusion of multiple 
gases and global trading will produce lower cost estimates.
104 
  Tellus had by far the most optimistic model results for the above elements.  Without even 
factoring in the benefits of avoided climate change, Tellus concludes that in 2020 there is a net 
benefit associated with a multi-pronged approach like that suggested by the McCain-Lieberman 
climate change policy proposal.
105  In stark contrast, WEFA appears the least optimistic.  
Specifically, the WEFA study assumed a higher level of economic growth in its baseline, higher 
resulting emissions, and no complementary programs to reduce emissions and specifically no use 
of carbon sinks, international trading or offsetting emissions (in spite of the fact that policy 
allows such cost-saving opportunities).
106   
  Consideration of all relevant policies can make a large difference in modeling results.  
Inclusion of factors such as international trading of greenhouse gases, offsets and non-CO2 gases 
reduce policy costs.  The European Union has just completed its first full year of its emissions 
trading program, which included all 25 member countries and will include in its next phase 
reductions from the lesser-developed countries through the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM).
107  Use of carbon sinks is allowed as part of Kyoto and even in the U.S. sinks and other 
offsets are recognized as legitimate offsets by a number of state climate programs and federal 
policy proposals.   
  The sheer number of state climate related programs that are in development today also 
supports the assumption made by the Tellus model developers that complementary programs 
would be implemented. EIA and CRA, while they assumed trading was allowed, assume that no 
other climate related policies (at the state or federal level) would be enacted (even though several 
states including nine northeastern states had already announced their intention to develop a 
regional cap and trade program).  EIA and CRA also structured their model to focus only on CO2 
emissions and thus were not able to capture significant low cost opportunities to reduce non-CO2 
greenhouse gases  in their models.
108  MIT, in contrast, allowed trading and non-CO2 gases to be 
reduced.  As such, MIT found considerably less fuel switching in our energy supply was required 
to meet the target, and their result was a lower cost estimate.   
  The importance of the scenario (and policy) modeled cannot be overstated.  As Weyant 
found, models (and policies) that include international trading will result in lower costs.  More 
recent efforts by MIT and others at Stanford’s Energy Modeling Forum have also found that 
including non-CO2 gases in the models (and in policy) reduces program costs.
109  By not 
including these other gases, EIA and CRA results thus likely overstate the costs of taking action.  
Clearly, the importance of including these other gases has not been lost on state climate policy 
efforts.  For example, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) just launched in seven 
New England states intends to allow reductions of non-CO2 gases as offsets and their modeling 
projects that an ample supply is available in the $2 to $4 per ton price range. 
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illustrates that reductions are often possible at no net cost – or even cost savings.
110  Historically, 
cost estimates for environmental policy have been overstated when compared to actual costs 
once a program is implemented.  For example, early estimates of the cost of the U.S. acid rain 
program were more than double the actual program costs.
111  Further, the benefits of previous 
environmental regulation have consistently been found to exceed the costs.
112
  With the implications of climate change on sea levels, droughts and storms, and its 
potentially devastating effects on human health and national security – the  costs of moderate, 
well-designed  policy  phased-in over time is preferable to  more draconian measures -- with 
much higher costs -- later.   
8. Moving Forward: U.S. Participation in New Global Agreements after 2012 
 
  Meaningful U.S. engagement in international efforts to address climate change depends 
not only on the perspectives and positions of the U.S. government but also on the international 
context in which such efforts takes place.  Accordingly, Section 8.1 starts with a global, rather 
than U.S.-centric, perspective on the conditions most conducive to a multilateral agreement on 
climate change.  Section 8.2 then focuses on the U.S. and describes options for how the U.S. 
might participate in the development of new global agreements on climate change.  
 
8.1 New Agreements:  An International Path Forward 
 
  Developing a coherent vision of how the international community might address climate 
change is no small task.  Meeting the needs of an extraordinarily diverse group of countries, 
while also taking steps sufficient to protect the global environment requires determination, 
creativity, and good-faith engagement.  One vision of the path forward was developed during the 
recent Climate Dialogue at Pocantico which was convened by the Pew Center on Global Climate 
Change.  In a series of sessions over a year-long period, senior policy-makers and stakeholders 
from 15 countries worked through options for advancing the international climate effort beyond 
2012.  Those deliberations yielded a framework comprising six core elements which, participants 
believed, are a prerequisite to effective international action.  Within this framework, Dialogue 
participants identified several options for strengthening multilateral action and also suggested 
new approaches to enhance international engagement.  A slightly abridged version of the 
summary of the final report of the Climate Dialogue is presented below.
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Framing the Future Effort 
 
  Meeting the challenge of climate change requires concerted international action and 
Dialogue participants affirmed that the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change provides 
a foundation for taking such action, as well as the core principles to guide such action.   Within 
this context, Dialogue participants agreed that a global agreement for 2012 and beyond should: 
 
•  Engage Major Economies: The immediate imperative is successfully engaging the 
world’s major economies. Twenty-five countries account for 83 percent of global 
greenhouse gas emissions, 71 percent of global population, and 86 percent of global 
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commit to stronger action, an equitable approach must be consistent with the principle of 
“common but differentiated responsibilities.”  
 
•  Provide Flexibility:  To broaden participation, the multilateral framework must be 
flexible enough to accommodate different types of national strategies by allowing 
different types of commitments. Each country must be able to choose a pathway that best 
aligns its national interests with the global interest in climate action. 
 
•  Couple Near-Term Action with a Long-Term Focus:  Near-term action is urgently needed 
on three fronts:  achieving immediate, cost-effective emission reductions; fostering the 
development of breakthrough technologies to achieve deeper reductions in the future; and 
strengthening resilience to the adverse effects of a changing climate. These efforts should 
be guided to the degree possible by a common view of the long-term objectives. 
 
•  Integrate Climate and Development: Countries can contribute to the international effort 
through actions that serve their development goals while simultaneously delivering 
climate benefits. In developing countries, efforts will be most successful if complemented 
by assistance, investment, and access to clean technologies. 
 
•  Address Adaptation Needs: The impacts of climate change are being felt already and are 
certain to intensify, even if immediate steps are taken to dramatically reduce emissions. 
These impacts fall disproportionately on the poor, particularly in developing countries. 
Fairness demands that they be assisted. 
 
•  Be Viewed as Fair:  A new global bargain on climate change will be possible only if each 
participating country perceives it to be reasonably fair. This assessment is ultimately a 
political one.  Each country will judge fairness in terms it believes it can defend both to 
its own citizens and to the global community 
 
Options for Strengthening Multilateral Action 
 
  Within the broad framework outlined above, Dialogue participants identified additional 
approaches that could facilitate concerted international action.  The most promising include: 
 
•  Aspirational Long-Term Goal:  Rather than attempt to negotiate a quantified long-term 
target, governments and others should continue to articulate their own visions of a long-
term objective. In time, these may coalesce into a more concrete common view 
informally guiding the international effort. 
 
•  Adaptation:  New assistance could support the development of national adaptation 
strategies and help highly vulnerable countries cope with urgent adaptation needs. Further 
steps are needed to discourage investments increasing climate vulnerability and promote 
those strengthening climate resilience. 
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should remain a core element of the multilateral effort. Future targets could vary in time, 
form, and stringency. In addition to binding absolute targets, other types could include 
intensity, “no-lose,” or conditional targets. Other market-based approaches could include 
a mechanism crediting policy-driven emission reductions in developing countries. 
 
•  Sectoral Approaches:  Commitments structured around key sectors such as power, 
transportation, or land use could take a variety of forms: emission targets, performance- 
or technology-based standards, or “best practice” agreements. 
 
•  Policy-based Approaches:  Countries could commit to broad goals integrating climate 
and development objectives, then pledge national measures to achieve them and report 
periodically on implementation and results. 
 
•  Technology Cooperation: Governments could coordinate and increase support for 
research and development of long-term technologies. Stronger cooperation also is needed 
to facilitate the deployment of clean technologies in developing countries. 
 
New Forms and Forums of Engagement 
 
  Forging new approaches that draw on these elements will pose extraordinary political, 
design, and negotiating challenges. Meeting them may require new forms—and new forums—of 
engagement: 
 
•  A Dialogue Among Major Economies:  On the political front, leaders of the major 
economies should convene an informal dialogue to seek consensus on the general nature 
and scope of multilateral efforts post-2012. While this dialogue could be convened within 
the UNFCCC process, it may be more practical and productive to convene it outside the 
process, with the understanding that formal agreements would be negotiated under the 
Framework Convention. 
 
•  Linking Approaches:   Multiple approaches could be pursued in parallel as different 
groups of countries engage with one another along different tracks. Such efforts could 
launch action on multiple fronts and yield valuable lessons to guide future steps. But an 
ad hoc assemblage of initiatives may not produce an overall effort that is sufficiently 
timely or robust. A more integrated approach could produce a stronger outcome. By 
linking and negotiating across tracks, governments may arrive at an arrangement flexible 
enough to accommodate different approaches and reciprocal enough to achieve higher 
levels of effort. It may help to agree at the outset that certain countries will negotiate 
within designated tracks appropriate to their circumstances. 
 
8.2 U.S. Participation in a New Global Agreement 
 
  President Bush repudiated the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001 and the U.S. effectively 
disengaged from international negotiations aimed at its implementation.  Once the Protocol 
entered into force in February 2005, the U.S. – having declined to ratify it – became ineligible 
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party to the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, however, the U.S. continues 
to participate in sessions of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Framework Convention.  
In a joint COP/MOP meeting in Montreal in late 2005, participants established parallel processes 
under the Convention and the Protocol to consider next steps in the international effort, thereby 
opening the door to U.S. participation in ongoing international negotiations.  Unfortunately, at 
the next COP/MOP meeting in Nairobi in November 2006, the U.S. (and developing countries) 
still strongly opposed any discussion of taking on binding commitments and the conference 
made little measurable progress toward new agreements on international action beyond 2012. 
 
  Despite Bush Administration opposition to negotiation of a new global climate change 
agreement, however, a growing number of powerful voices in the U.S. have called for re-
engagement in international discussions.  For example, on March 29, 2007, the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, on a bi-partisan basis, adopted the Biden-Lugar resolution on “American 
Leadership on Climate Change.”  Though non-binding, the resolution calls for the U.S. to resume 
its role as a leader in international efforts to address global warming and endorses a “significant 
long-term reduction in global emissions.”   While calling for mitigation commitments by all 
countries that are major emitters, the resolution explicitly accepts the principle of “common but 
differentiated responsibilities” when setting such commitments.  What’s more, the resolution 
does not set any preconditions for U.S. re-engagement in international negotiations.  The 
resolution will likely go to the full Senate for a vote at some point in the coming months and 
prospects for passage are very good. 
 
  The business sector has also increasingly advocated a change in the U.S. posture toward 
international negotiations.  The U.S. CAP coalition (discussed in Section 5) made a strong 
statement about international negotiations, saying that “U.S. action to implement mandatory 
measures and incentives for reducing emissions should not be contingent on simultaneous action 
by other countries.   Rather, we believe that U.S. leadership is essential for establishing an 
equitable and effective international policy framework for robust action by all major emitting 
countries.”
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  States are reaching out to other countries, indicating a desire to be part of a global 
solution.  California has taken several steps to engage in international efforts to address climate 
change.  In July 2006,  Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
signed an agreement to implement market-based mechanisms to limit emissions and to 
collaborate on science, technology, and economic research.  In December 2006, California and 
the Canadian province of Manitoba agreed to work cooperatively to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions and to explore linking future carbon trading markets.   
 
  While California, of course, lacks the authority to commit the United States to 
international agreements, the state’s action – along with positions advocated by prominent 
Congressional leaders, major U.S. corporations, and large NGOs – is indicative of a growing 
dissatisfaction with the Bush Administration’s refusal to engage in international negotiations to 
agree on climate measures for the post-2012 period.  Many Presidential candidates are making 
climate change an issue.  Surveys show increasing public concern about global warming: double 
the number of people rank it first among environmental concerns from just one year ago, and the 
24 April Working Draft - Page 44 of 49 public indicates that they have more trust that the Democratic Congress on this issue than 
President Bush (59% vs. 19% respectively).
115   Given these trends, prospects for U.S. re-
engagement in international negotiations are likely to improve significantly in the coming two or 
three years. 
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